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This article proposes quantitative answers to meta-scientific
questions including ‘how much knowledge is attained by a
research field?’, ‘how rapidly is a field making progress?’,
‘what is the expected reproducibility of a result?’, ‘how much
knowledge is lost from scientific bias and misconduct?’,
‘what do we mean by soft science?’, and ‘what demarcates a
pseudoscience?’. Knowledge is suggested to be a system-
specific property measured by K, a quantity determined by
how much of the information contained in an explanandum is
compressed by an explanans, which is composed of an
information ‘input’ and a ‘theory/methodology’ conditioning
factor. This approach is justified on three grounds: (i) K is
derived from postulating that information is finite and
knowledge is information compression; (ii) K is compatible and
convertible to ordinary measures of effect size and algorithmic
complexity; (iii) K is physically interpretable as a measure of
entropic efficiency. Moreover, the K function has useful
properties that support its potential as a measure of
knowledge. Examples given to illustrate the possible uses of K
include: the knowledge value of proving Fermat’s last theorem;
the accuracy of measurements of the mass of the electron; the
half life of predictions of solar eclipses; the usefulness of
evolutionary models of reproductive skew; the significance
of gender differences in personality; the sources of
irreproducibility in psychology; the impact of scientific
misconduct and questionable research practices; the knowledge
value of astrology. Furthermore, measures derived from K may
complement ordinary meta-analysis and may give rise to a
universal classification of sciences and pseudosciences. Simple
and memorable mathematical formulae that summarize the
theory’s key results may find practical uses in meta-research,
philosophy and research policy.
1. Introduction
A science of science is flourishing in all disciplines and promises
to boost discovery on all research fronts [1]. Commonly branded
‘meta-science’ or ‘meta-research’, this rapidly expanding
& 2019 The Authors. Published by the Royal Society under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/, which permits
unrestricted use, provided the original author and source are credited.
literature of empirical studies, experiments, interventions and theoretical models explicitly aims to take a
‘bird’s eye view’ of science and a decidedly cross-disciplinary approach to studying the scientific method,
which is dissected and experimented upon as any other topic of academic inquiry. To fully mature into
an independent field, meta-research needs a fully cross-disciplinary, quantitative and operationalizable
theory of scientific knowledge—a unifying paradigm that, in simple words, can help tell apart ‘good’
from ‘bad’ science.
This article proposes such a meta-scientific theory and methodology. By means of analyses and
practical examples, it suggests that a system-specific quantity named ‘K’ can help answer meta-
scientific questions including ‘how much knowledge is attained by a research field?’, ‘how rapidly is a
field making progress?’, ‘what is the expected reproducibility of a result?’, ‘how much knowledge is
lost from scientific bias and misconduct?’, ‘what do we mean by soft science?’, and ‘what demarcates
a pseudoscience?’.
The theoretical and methodological framework proposed in this article is built upon basic notions of
classic and algorithmic information theory, which have been rarely used in a meta-research context. The
key innovation introduced is a function that, it will be argued, quantifies the essential phenomenology of
knowledge, scientific or otherwise. This approach rests upon a long history of advances made in
combining epistemology and information theory. The concept that scientific knowledge consists in
pattern encoding can be traced back at least to the polymath and father of positive philosophy August
Comte (1798–1857) [2], and the connection between knowledge and information compression ante
litteram to the writings of Ernst Mach (1838–1916) and his concept of ‘economy of thought’ [3].
Claude Shannon’s theory of communication gave a mathematical language to quantify information
[4], whose applications to physical science were soon examined by Le´on Brillouin (1889–1969) [5]. The
independent works of Solomonoff, Kolmogorov and Chaitin gave rise to algorithmic information
theory, which dispenses of the notion of probability in favour of that of complexity and
compressibility of strings [6]. The notion of learning as information compression was formalized in
Rissanen’s minimum description length principle [7], which has fruitful and expanding applications in
statistical inference and machine learning [8,9]. From a philosophical perspective, the relation between
knowledge and information was explored by Fred Dretske [10], and a computational philosophy of
science was elaborated by Paul Thagard [11]. To the best of the author’s knowledge, however, the
main ideas and formulae presented in this article were never proposed before (see Discussion for
further details).
The article is organized as follows. In §2, the core mathematical approach is presented. This verges on
a single equation, the K function, whose terms are described in §2.1, and whose derivation and
justification are described in §2.2 by a theoretical, a statistical and a physical argument. Section 2.3
explains and discusses properties of the K function. These properties further support the claim that K
is a universal quantifier of knowledge, and they lay out the bases for developing a methodology. The
methodology is illustrated in §3, which offers practical examples of how the theory may help answer
typical meta-research questions. These questions include: how to quantify theoretical and empirical
knowledge (§3.1 and 3.2, respectively), how to quantify scientific progress within or across fields
(§3.3), how to forecast reproducibility (§3.4), how to estimate the knowledge value of null and
negative results (§3.5), how to compare the knowledge costs of bias, misconduct and QRP (§3.6) and
how to define a ‘soft’ science (§3.8) and a pseudoscience (§3.7). These results are expressed in simple
and memorable formulae (table 1), and are further summarized in §4, where the theory’s predictions,
limitations and testability are discussed. The essay’s sections make cross-reference to each other but
can be read in any order with little loss of comprehensibility.
2. Analysis
2.1. The quantity of knowledge
At the core of the theory and methodology proposed, which will henceforth be called ‘K-theory’, is the
claim that knowledge is a system-specific property measured by a quantity symbolized by a ‘K’ and
given by the function
K(YnY ; XnX , t) ;
nYH(Y) nYH(YjX, t)
nYH(Y)þ nXH(X) log p(t) (2:1)
in which each term represents a quantify of information. What is information? In a very general and
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intuitive sense, information consists in questions we do not have answers to, or, equivalently, it consists
in answers to those questions. Any object or event y that has a probability p(y) carries a quantity of
information equal to
logA p(y) ¼ logA
1
p(y)
(2:2)
that quantifies the number of questions with A possible answers that we would need to ask to determine
y. The logarithm’s base, A, could have any value, but we will always assume that A ¼ 2 and therefore that
Table 1. K theory’s answers to meta-scientiﬁc questions.
question formula interpretation section
How much knowledge is
contained in a
theoretical system?
K ¼ h Logico-deductive knowledge is a lossless
compression of noise-free systems. Its
value is inversely related to complexity and
directly related to the extent of domain of
application.
3.1
How much knowledge is
contained in an
empirical system?
K ¼ k  h Empirical knowledge is lossy compression. It
is encoded in a theory/methodology whose
predictions have a non-zero error. It
follows that Kempirical , Ktheoretical.
3.2
How much progress is a
ﬁeld making?
mDX þ Dt , nY Dk
K
Progress occurs to the extent that
explanandum and/or explanatory power
expand more than the explanans. This is
the essence of consilience.
3.3
How reproducible is a
research ﬁnding?
Kr ¼ KAld The ratio between the K of a study and its
replication Kr is an exponentially declining
function of the distance between their
systems and/or methodologies.
3.4
What is the value of a
null or negative result?
Knull  hY log jT jjT j1 The knowledge yielded by a single conclusive
negative result is an exponentially
declining function of the total number of
hypotheses (theories, methods,
explanations or outcomes) jT j that
remain untested.
3.5
What is the cost of
research fabrication,
falsiﬁcation, bias and
QRP?
Kcorr ¼ K  huhb B The K corrected for a questioned methodology
is inversely proportional to the
methodology’s relative description length
times the bias it generates (B).
3.6
When is a ﬁeld a
pseudoscience?
K , hu
hb
B A pseudoscience results from a hyper-biased
theory/methodology that produces net
negative knowledge. Conversely, a science
has K . B hu
hb
.
3.7
What makes a science
‘soft’?
kH
kS
.
hS
hH
Compared to a harder science (H), a softer
science (S) yields relatively lower
knowledge at the cost of relatively more
complex theories and methods.
3.8
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information is measured in ‘bits’, i.e. in binary questions. Shannon’s entropy
H(Y) ; 
X
pY(y) log pY(y) ¼
X
pY(y) log
1
pY(y)
¼ E log 1
PY(Y)
 
(2:3)
is the expected value of the information in a random variable Y. A sequence of events, objects or random
variables, for example, a string of bits 101100011 . . ., is of course just another object, event or random
variable, and therefore is quantifiable by the same logic [6,12].
The three terms in function (2.1) are defined as follows:
— Y constitutes the explanandum, latin for ‘what is to the explained’. Examples of explananda include:
response variables in regression analysis, physical properties to be measured, experimental
outcomes, unknown answers to questions.
— X and t together constitute the explanans, latin for ‘what does the explaining’. In particular,
(a) X will be referred to as the ‘input’, and it will represent information acquired externally. Examples
of inputs include: results of any measurement, explanatory variables in regression analysis,
physical constants, arbitrary methodological decisions and all other factors that are not ‘rigidly’
encoded in the theory or methodology.
(b) t will be referred to as the ‘theory’ or ‘methodology’. A typical t is likely to contain both a
description of the relation between Y and X, as well as a specification of all other
conditions that allow the relationship between X and Y to manifest. Examples of t include:
an algorithm to reproduce Y, a description of a physical law relating Y to X, a description
of the methodology of a study or a field (i.e. description of how subjects are selected, how
measurements are made, etc.).
Specific examples of all of these terms will be offered repeatedly throughout the essay. Mathematically,
all three terms ultimately consist of sequences, produced by random variables and therefore
characterized by a specific quantity of information. In the cases most typically discussed in this essay,
explanandum and input will be assumed to be sequences of lengths nY and nX, respectively, resulting
from a series of independent identically distributed random variables, Y and X, with discrete
alphabets Y, X , probability distributions pY, pX and therefore Shannon entropy H(Y ) and H(X ).
The object representing the theory or methodology t will be typically more complex than Y and X,
because it will consist in a sequence of independent random variables (henceforth, RVs) that have
distinctive alphabets (are non-identical) and are all uniformly distributed. This sequence of RVs
represents the sequence of choices that define a theory and/or methodology. Indicating with T a RV
with uniform probability distribution PT, resulting from a sequence of l RVs Ti [ fT1, T2 . . . Tlg each
with a probability distribution PTi , we have
log
1
pT(t)
¼ log 1
Pr{T1 ¼ t1, T2 ¼ t2, . . .Tl ¼ tl} ¼
X
il
log
1
PTi (Ti ¼ ti)
: (2:4)
The alphabet of each individual RV composing t may have size greater than or equal to 2, with
equality corresponding to a binary choice. For example, let t correspond to the description of three
components of a study’s method: t ¼ (‘randomized’, ‘human subject’, ‘female’). In the simplest
possible condition, this sequence represents a draw from three independent binary choices: 1 ¼
‘randomized vs not’, 2 ¼ ‘human vs not’, 3 ¼ ‘female vs not’. Representing each choice as a binary RV
Ti, the probability of t is PrfT1 ¼ t1g  PrfT2 ¼ t2g  PrfT3 ¼ t3g ¼ 0.53 ¼ 0.125 and its information
content is 3 bits.
Equivalent and useful formulations of equation (2.1) are
K(YnY ; XnX , t) ¼ H(Y)H(YjX, t)
H(Y)þ nX
nY
H(X) 1
nY
log p(t)
(2:5)
and
K(YnY ; XnX , t) ¼ k  h (2:6)
in which
k ;
H(Y)H(YjX, t)
H(Y)
(2:7)
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will be referred to as the ‘effect’ component, because it embodies what is often quantified by ordinary
measures of effect size (§2.2.2), and
h ;
1
1þ nXH(X) log p(t)
nYH(Y)
(2:8)
will be referred to as the ‘hardness’ component, because it quantifies the informational costs of a
methodology, which is connected to the concept of ‘soft science’, as will be explained in §3.8.
2.2. Why K is a measure of knowledge
Why do we claim that equation (2.1) quantifies the essence of knowledge? This section will offer three
different arguments. First, a theoretical argument, which illustrates the logic by which the K function
was originally derived, i.e. following two postulates about the nature of information and knowledge.
Second, a statistical argument, which illustrates how the K function includes the quantities that are
typically computed in ordinary measures of effect size. Third, a physical argument, which explains
how the K function, unlike ordinary measures of effect size or information compression, has a direct
physical interpretation in terms of negentropic efficiency.
2.2.1. Theoretical argument: K as a measure of pattern encoding
Equation (2.1) is the mathematical translation of two postulates concerning the nature of the phenomenon
we call knowledge:
(i) Information is finite. Whatever its ultimate nature may be, reality is knowable only to the extent that it
can be represented as a set of discrete, distinguishable states. Although in theory the number of states
could be infinite (countably infinite, that is), physical limitations ensure that the number of states that
are actually represented and processed never is or can be infinite.
(ii) Knowledge is information compression. Knowledge is manifested as an encoding of patterns that connect
states, thereby permitting the anticipation of states not yet presented, based on states that are
presented. All forms of biological adaptation consist in the encoding of patterns and regularities
by means of natural selection. Human cognition and science are merely highly derived
manifestations of this process.
Physical, biological and philosophical arguments in support of these two postulates are offered in
appendix A.
The most general quantification of patterns between finite states is given by Shannon’s mutual
information function
I(Y; X) ; H(Y)þH(X)H(Y, X) ¼ H(Y)H(YjX) (2:9)
in which H(  ) is Shannon’s entropy (equation (2.3)). The mutual information function is completely free
from any assumption concerning the random variables involved (figure 1). In order to turn equation (2.9)
into an operationalizable quantity of knowledge, we formalize the following properties:
(i) The pattern between Y and X is explicitly expressed by a conditioning. We therefore posit the
existence of a third random variable, T, with alphabet T ¼ {ta, tb . . . }, such that H(Y, XjT ) ¼
H(YjT ) þ H(YjX, T ), or H(Y, XjT ) ¼ H(Y ) þ H(X ) if T ¼ ;. Unlike Y and X, T is assumed to be
uniformly distributed, and therefore the size of its alphabet is z ¼ jT j ¼ 2n, where n is the
minimum number of bits required to describe each t in the set. The uniform distribution of T also
implies that H(T ) ¼ 2logPrfT ¼ tg ¼ n.
(ii) The mutual information expressing the pattern as described above is standardized (i.e. divided by the
total information content of its own terms), in order to allow comparisons between different systems.
The two requirement above lead us to formulate knowledge as resulting from the contextual, system-
specific connection of the quantities, defined by the following equation:
I(Y; XjT)
H(Y)þH(X)þH(T) ;
H(Y)H(YjX, T)
H(Y)þH(X)þH(T) (2:10)
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in which, to simplify the notation, we will typically use H(Y ) in place of H(YjT ) and H(X ) in place of
H(XjT ).
Note how, at this stage, the value computed by equation (2.10) is potentially very low, because
H(YjX, T) ¼Pti[T P(T ¼ ti)H(YjX, T ¼ ti) is the average value of the conditional entropy for every
possible theory of description length 2log p(t). The more complex is the average t [ T , the larger is
the number of possible theories of equivalent description length, and therefore the smaller is the
proportion of theories ti that yield H(YjX, T ¼ ti) , H(Y ) (because most realizable theories are likely
to be nonsensical).
Knowledge is realized because, from all possible theories, only a specific theory (or possibly a subset
of theories) is selected (figure 2). This selection is not merely a mathematical fiction, but is typically the
result of Darwinian natural selection and/or other analogous neurological, memetic and computational
processes. The details of how a t is arrived at, however, need not concern us because, in mathematical
terms, the result of a selection process is the same: the selection ‘fixes’ the random variable T in
equation (2.10) on a particular realization t [ T , with two consequences. On the one hand, the
entropy of T goes to zero (because there is no longer any uncertainty about T), but on the other hand,
the selection itself entails a non-zero amount of information.
Since T has a uniform distribution, the information necessary to identify this realization of T is simply
2logP(T ¼ t) ¼ log 2l(t) ¼ l(t), which is the shortest description length of t (e.g. the minimum number of
binary questions needed to identify t in the alphabet of T). This quantity constitutes an informational cost
that needs to be computed in the standardized equation (2.10). Therefore, we get
K(Y; X, t) ¼ H(YjT ¼ t)H(YjX, T ¼ t)
H(YjT ¼ t)þH(XjT ¼ t)þH(TjT ¼ t)þ l(t) ;
H(Y)H(YjX, t)
H(Y)þH(X) log p(t) : (2:11)
Equation (2.1) is arrived at by generalizing (2.11) to the case in which the knowledge encoded by t is
applied to multiple independent realizations of explanandum and/or input, which are counted by the
nY and nX terms, respectively.
t : Δ t : ‘Y = X’ t : ‘Y = X + N(0, 1)’
t : ‘Y = X + N(0, 1), X = 7’
t : ‘Y2 + X2 = 36 &
{(–2, 2), (2, 2), (0, 0)...}’t : ‘Y2 + X2 = 36’
H(X) = 3.91
I(Y;X) = 0
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) ( f )
H
(Y
) =
 3.
91
H
(Y
|X 
=
 7
)=
 1
.6
3
H
(Y
) =
 3.
64
H
(Y
) =
 3.
58
H
(Y
) =
 3.
91
H
(Y
) =
 3.
90
H(X) = 3.91
I(Y;X) = 3.91
H(X) = 3.90
I(Y;X) = 2.38
H(X|X = 7) = 0
I(Y;X|X = 7) = H(Y ) – H(Y|X = 7) = 2.27
H(X) = 3.64
I(Y;X) = 2.28
H(X) = 3.62
I(Y;X) = 1.82
Figure 1. Pictorial representation of various patterns, with corresponding values of entropy and mutual information. The
descriptions of the patterns t are purely illustrative and not necessarily literal descriptions of what the pattern encodings
would look like in practice. The intensity of grey in each cell represents the relative probability of occurrence of different cell
values, with black¼ 1 and white¼ 0. The entropy and mutual information values were calculated by normalizing the cell
values in the table or at the margins. For further details, see the source code in electronic supplementary material.
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2.2.2. Statistical argument: K as a universal measure of effect size
Despite having been derived theoretically and being potentially applicable to phenomena of any kind,
i.e. not merely statistical ones, equation (2.1) bears structural similarities with ordinary measures of
statistical effect size. Such similarities ought not to be surprising, in retrospect. Statistical measures of
effect size are intended to quantify knowledge about patterns between variables, and so K would be
expected to reflect them. Indeed, structural analogies between the K function and other measures of
effect size offer further support for the theoretical argument made above that K is a general quantifier
of knowledge.
To illustrate such similarities, it is useful to point out that the value of the K function can be
approximated from the quantization of any continuous probability distribution. For information to be
finite as required by the K function, the entropy of a normally distributed quantized random variable
XD can be approximated by H(XD) ¼ log ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ2pep s, in which s is the standard deviation rescaled to a
lowest decimal (for example, from s ¼ 0.123 to s ¼ 123, further details in appendix B).
There is a clear structural similarity between the k component of equation (2.6) and the coefficient of
determination R2. Since the entropy of a random variable is a monotonically increasing function of the
variable’s dispersion (e.g. its variance), this measure is directly related to K. For example, if Y and YjX
are continuous normally distributed RVs with variance sY and sYjX, respectively, then R
2 is a function
of K,
R2 ;
TSS SSE
TSS
;
n (s2Y  s2YjX)
n s2Y
¼ f logsY  logsYjX
logsY þ C
 
¼ f(K(Y; X, t)) (2:12)
in which TSS is the total sum of squares, SSE is the sum of squared errors, n is the sample size and f (.)
represents an undefined function. The adjusted coefficient of determination R2adj is also directly related to
K since
R2adj ;
TSS=(n 1) SSE=(n k  1)
TSS=(n 1) ¼ g
logs2y  log (s2yjx  A)
logs2y
 !
¼ f(K(Y; X, t)) (2:13)
with A ¼ (n2 1)/(n2 k2 1).
From this relation follows that multiple ordinary measures of statistical effects size used in meta-
analysis are also functions of K. For example, for any two continuous random variables, R2 ¼ r2, with
r the correlation coefficient. And since most popular measures of effect size used in meta-analysis,
T = t55
Figure 2. Pictorial representation of a set T ¼ {t1, t2, . . . tz} of theories of a given description length that condition the
relation between two variables. This set constitutes the alphabet of the uniformly distributed random variable T, from which a
specific theory/methodology, in this case t55, is selected. For further discussion, see text.
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including Cohen’s d and odds ratios, are approximately convertible to and from r [13], they are also
convertible to K.
The direct connection between K and measures of effect size like Cohen’s d implies that K is also
related to the t and the F distributions, which are constructed as ratios between the amount of what is
explained and what remains to be explained, and are therefore constructed similarly to an ‘odds’
transformation of K
K(Y; X, t)
1 K(Y; X, t) ¼
nY(H(Y)H(YjX, t))
nYH(YjX, t)þ nXH(X) log p(t) : (2:14)
Other more general tests, such as the Chi-squared test, can be shown to be an approximation of the
Kullback–Leibler distance between the probability distributions of observed and expected frequencies
[12]. Therefore, they are a measure of the mutual information between two random variables, i.e. the
same measure on which the K function is built.
Figure 3 illustrates how these are not merely structural analogies, because K can be approximately or
exactly converted to ordinary measures of effect size. As the figure illustrates, K stands in one-to-one
correspondence with ordinary measures of effect sizes, but its specific value is modulated by
additional variables that are critical to knowledge and that are ignored by ordinary measures of effect
size. Such variables include the size of the theory or methodology describing the pattern, which is
always non-zero, the number of repetitions (which, depending on analyses, may correspond to the
sample size or to the intended total number of uses of a t); the resolution (e.g. accuracy of
measurement, §2.3.6); distance in time and space and methods (§2.3.5) and Ockham’s razor (§2.3.1).
0.2
0.1
0
0
0
0 25 50 75 100 0 25 50 75 100
5 10 15 20 0 5 10 15 20
0.25 0.50
R2
c2 c2
Cohen’s d (absolute value) Cohen’s d (absolute value)
R2
K, varying accuracy(a) (b)
(c)
(e) ( f )
(d)
relation between K and statistical measures
K, varying n
K, varying accuracy K, varying n
K, varying n, l(t) = 1 K, varying n, l(t) = 100
0.75 1.00 0 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
0.2
0.1
0
0.2
0.1
0
0.2
0.1
0
0.2
0.1
0
0.2
0.1
0
Figure 3. Relation between K and common measures of effect size, with varying conditions of accuracy (i.e. of resolution, see
§2.3.6), number of repetitions n (i.e. the nY in equation (2.1)) and size of t. The relation with R
2 and Cohen’s d was derived
assuming a normal distribution of the explanandum. Increasing accuracy, in this case, corresponded to calculating entropies
with a standard deviation measured with one additional significant digit, at each step, from solid line to dotted line. The
values of n for R2 and Cohen’s d were, from dotted to solid line, 1, 2, 10, 100, respectively. The relation with x2 was derived
from the probability distribution of a 2  2 contingency table. From solid to dotted line, the value of n was 20, 40, 80, 100,
and the description length of t was 1 bit for (a,c,e), and 100 bits for (b,d,f ). The code used to generate these and all other
figures is available in electronic supplementary material.
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The latter property also makes K conceptually analogous to measures of minimum description length,
discussed below.
Minimum description length principle. The minimum description length (MDL) principle is a
formalization of the principle of inductive inference and of Ockham’s razor that has many potential
applications in statistical inference, particularly with regard to the problem of model selection [8]. In
its most basic formulation, the MDL principle states that the best model to explain a dataset is the one
that minimizes the quantity
L(H)þ L(DjH) (2:15)
in which L(H ) is the description length of the hypothesis (i.e. a candidate model for the data) and L(DjH )
is the description length of the data given the model. The K equation has equivalent properties to
equation (2.15), with L(H ) ; 2log p(t) and L(DjH ); nYH(YjX, t). Therefore, the values that minimize
equation (2.15) maximize the K function.
The reader may question why, if K is equivalent to existing statistical measures of effect size and
MDL, we could not just use the latter to quantify knowledge. There are at least three reasons. The
first reason is that only K is a universal measure of effect size. The quantity measured by K is
completely free from any distributional assumptions about the subject matter being assessed. It can be
applied not only to quantitative data with any distribution (e.g. figure 1), but also to any other
explanandum that has a finite description length (although this potential application will not be
examined in detail in this essay). In essence, K can be applied to anything that is quantifiable in terms
of information, which means any phenomenon that is the object of cognition—any phenomenon
amenable to being ‘known’.
The second reason is that, as illustrated above, K takes into account factors that are overlooked by
ordinary measures of effect size or model fit, and therefore is a more complete representation of
knowledge phenomena (figure 3).
The third reason is that, unlike any of the statistical and algorithmic approaches mentioned above, K
has a straightforward physical interpretation, which is presented in the next section.
2.2.3. Physical argument: K as a measure of negentropic efficiency
The physical interpretation of equation (2.1) follows from the physical interpretation of information,
which was revealed by the solution to the famous paradox known as Maxwell’s Demon. In the most
general formulation of this Gedankenexperiment, the demon is an organism or a machine that is able to
manipulate molecules of a gas, for example, by operating a trap door, and is thus able to segregate
molecules that move at higher speed from those that move at lower speed, seemingly without
dissipation. This created a theoretical paradox as it would contradict the second law of
thermodynamics, according to which no process can have as its only result the transfer of heat from a
cooler to a warmer body.
In one variant of this paradox, called the ‘pressure demon’, a cylinder is immersed in a heat bath and
has a single ‘gas’ molecule moving randomly inside it. The demon inserts a partition right in the middle
of the cylinder, thereby trapping the molecule in one half of the cylinder’s volume. It then operates a
measurement to assess in which half of the cylinder the molecule is, and pushes down, with a
reversible process, a piston in the half that is empty. The demon could then remove the partition,
allowing the gas molecule to push the piston up, and thus extract work from the system, apparently
without dissipating any energy.
Objections to the paradox that involve the energetic costs of operating the machine or of measuring
the position of the particle [5] were proven to be invalid, at least from a theoretical point of view [6,14].
The conclusive solution to the paradox was given in 1982 by Charles Bennett, who showed that
dissipation in the process occurred as a byproduct of the demon’s need to process information [15]. In
order to know which piston to lower, the demon must memorize the position of the molecule, storing
one bit of information, and it must eventually re-set its memory to prepare it for the next
measurement. The recording of information can occur with no dissipation, but the erasure of it is an
irreversible process that will produce heat that is at least equivalent to the work extracted from the
system, i.e kTln2 joules, in which k is Boltzmann’s constant. This solution to the paradox proved that
information is a measurable physical quantity.
Figure 4 illustrates how the K function relates to Maxwell’s pressure demon. The explanandum H(Y )
(which is a shorthand for H(Yjt), as explained previously) quantifies the entropy, i.e. the amount of
uncertainty about the molecule’s position relative to the partition in the cylinder. The input H(X ) is
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the external information obtained by a measurement. The input corresponds to the colloquial notion of
‘information’ as something that is acquired and ‘gives form’ (to subsequent choices, actions, etc.). Since
this latter notion of information is a counterpart to the physical notion of information as entropy, it may
be perhaps more correctly defined as negentropy [5].
The theory t contains a description of the information-processing structure that allows the Pressure
Demon to operate. The extent of this description will depend in part on how the system is defined. A
minimal description will include at least an encoding of the identity relation between the state of X
and that of Y, i.e. ‘X ¼ Y’ as distinguished from its alternative, ‘X= Y’. This theory requires at least a
binary alphabet and therefore one bit of memory storage. A more comprehensive description will
include a description of the algorithm that enables the negentropy in X to be exploited—something
like ‘if X ¼ left, press down right piston, else, press left piston’. Multiple other aspects of the system
may be included in t. The amount of information contained in the explanandum, for example, is a
function of where the partition is laid down, a variable that a truly complete algorithm would need to
specify. The broadest possible physical description of the pressure demon ought to encode
instructions to set up the entire system, i.e. the heat bath, the partition etc. In other words, a complete
t contains the genetic code to reproduce pressure demons.
The description length of t will, intuitively, also depend on the language used to describe it.
Moreover, some descriptions might be less succinct than others and contain redundancies,
unnecessary complexities, etc. From a physical point of view, however, it is well understood that each
t would be characterized by its own specific minimum amount of information, a quantity known as
Kolmogorov complexity [6]. This is defined as the shortest program that, if fed into a universal Turing
machine, would output the t and then halt. Mathematical theorems prove that this quantity cannot be
computed directly—at least in the sense that one can never be sure to have found the shortest
possible program. In practice, however, the Kolmogorov complexity of an object is approximated, by
excess, by any information compression algorithm and is independent of the encoding language
used, up to a constant. This means that, even though we cannot measure the Kolmogorov complexity
in absolute terms, we can measure it rather reliably in relative terms. A t that is more complex,
and/or more redundant than another t will necessarily have, all else being equal, a longer
description length.
Whether we take t to represent the theoretical shortest possible description length for the demon (in
which case 2log p(t) quantifies its Kolmogorov complexity), or whether we assume that it is a realistic,
suboptimal description (in which case the description length 2log p(t) is best interpreted in relative
terms), the K function expresses the efficiency with which the demon converts information into work.
x = 0
x =
 1 x = 1
y
x = 0
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) ( f )
H(Y|t) = 1
H(Y|X,t) = 1 H(Y|X,t) = 0x
 =
 1
t t
tt t
t
x = 0
1 – 1
1 + 0 + t
K =  = 0
1 – 1
1 + 0 + t
K =  = 0
1
1 + 1 + t
K = 1
1 + 1 + t
K < 
1
1 + 1 + t
K = 
nY
Figure 4. Illustration of Maxwell’s ‘pressure demon’ paradox, and how it relates to K. (a) The system is set up, described by t, with
a default memory state X ¼ 0. (b) A partition is placed in the cylinder, generating one bit of information in the explanandum Y. The
demon has zero knowledge about the molecule’s position. (c) A measurement is made, allowing the position of the molecule to be
stored in memory. An amount K of knowledge is now possessed by the demon and put to use. (d ) One of the pistons is pushed
down allowing work to be extracted from the system. (e) Work is extracted at the expense of the demon’s knowledge. ( f ) The
demon’s knowledge is now zero and its memory is re-set, dissipating entropy in the environment. The cycle will be repeated
nY times. See text for further explanations.
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At the start of the cycle, the demon’s K is zero. After measuring the particle’s position, the demon has
stored one bit of information (or less, if the partition is not placed in the middle of the cylinder, but we
will here assume that it is), and has knowledge K. 0, with the magnitude of K inversely related to the
description length of t. By setting the piston and removing the partition, the demon puts its knowledge
to use and extracts k ln 2 of work from it. Once the piston is fully pushed out, the demon no longer
knows where the molecule is (K ¼ 0) and yet still has one bit stored in memory, a trace of its last
experience. The demon has now two possible options. First, as in Bennett’s solution to the paradox, it
can simply erase that bit, re-setting X to the initial state H(X ) ¼ 0 and releasing k ln 2 in the
environment. At each cycle, the negentropy is renewed via a new measurement, whereas the fixed t
component remains unaltered. Since the position of the molecule at each cycle is independent of
previous positions, the total cumulative explanandum (the total entropy that the demon has reduced)
grows by one bit, whereas the theory component remains unaltered. For n cycles, the total K is therefore
K ¼ nH(Y)
nH(Y)þ nH(X) log p(t) ¼
1
1þ 1 log p(t)
n
, (2:16)
which to the limit of infinite cycles is
lim
n!1K ¼
1
2
: (2:17)
The value of K ¼ 1/2 constitutes the absolute limit for knowledge that requires a direct measurement
and/or a complete and direct description of the explanandum.
Alternatively, the demon could keep the value of X in memory and allocate new memory space for
the information to be gathered in the next cycle ([6]). As Bennett also pointed out, in practice it could not
do so forever. In any physical implementation of the experiment, the demon would eventually run out of
memory space and would be forced to erase some of it, releasing the entropy locked in it. If, ad absurdum,
the demon stored an infinite amount of information, then at each cycle the input would grow by one bit
yielding
K ¼ 1
1þ n log p(t)
n
, (2:18)
which to the limit of infinite cycles is
lim
n!1K ¼ 0 (2:19)
again independent of t. This is a further argument to illustrate how information is necessarily finite, as
we postulated (§2.2.1, see also §2.3.6 for another mathematical argument and appendix A for
philosophical and scientific arguments).
More realistically, we can imagine that the number of physical bits available to the demon is finite. As
cycles progress, the demon could try to allocate as many resources as possible to the memory X, for
example, by reducing the space occupied by t. This is why knowledge entails compression and
pattern encoding (see also §2.3.1).
Elaborations on the pressure demon experiment shed further light on the meaning of K and its
implications for knowledge. First, let us imagine that the movement of the gas molecule is not
actually random, but that, acted upon by some external force, the molecule periodically and regularly
finds itself alternatively on the right and left side of the cylinder, and expands from there. If the
demon kept a sufficiently long record of past measurements, say a number z of bits, it might be able
to discover the pattern. Its t could then store a new, slightly expanded algorithm, such as ‘if last
position was left, new position is right, else, new position is left’. With this new theory, and one bit of
input to determine the initial position of the molecule, the demon could extract unlimited amounts of
energy from the heat bath. In this case,
K ¼ 1
1þ 1
n
 log p(t)
n
(2:20)
which to the limit of infinite cycles is
lim
n!1K ¼ 1: (2:21)
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Therefore, the maximum amount of knowledge expressed in a system asymptotically approaches 1.
As we would expect, it is higher than the maximum value of 1/2 attained by mere descriptions. Note,
however, that K can never actually be equal to 1, since n is never actually infinite and t cannot be 0.
Intermediate cases are also easy to imagine, in which the behaviour of the molecule is predictable
only for a limited number of cycles, say c. In such case, K would increase as the number of necessary
measurements nX is reduced to nX/c. At any rate, this example illustrated how the demon’s ability to
implement knowledge (in order to extract work, create order, etc.) is determined by the presence of
regularities in the explanandum as well as the efficiency with which the demon can identify and
encode patterns. Since this ability is higher when the explanans is minimized, the demon (the t) is
selected to be as ‘intelligent’ and ‘informed’ as possible.
As a final case, let us imagine instead that the gas molecule moves at random and that its position is
measurable only to limited accuracy. A single measurement yields the position of the molecule with an
error h. However, each additional measurement reduces h by a fraction a. The demon, in this case, could
benefit from increasing the number of measurements. Indicating with m the number of measurements
and with tm the corresponding theory we have
K ¼ 1 h a
m
1þm log p(tm)
n
(2:22)
that to the limit of infinite cycles is
lim
n!1K ¼
1 h am
1þm ,
1
2
: (2:23)
The work extracted at each cycle will be k ln 2 (12 h  a2m). Therefore, K expresses the efficiency
with which work can be extracted from a system, given a certain error rate a and number of
measurements m.
2.3. Properties of knowledge
This section will illustrate how K possesses properties that a measure of knowledge would be expected to
possess. In addition to offering support for the three arguments given above, these properties underlie
some of the results presented in §3.
2.3.1. Ockham’s razor is relative.
As discussed in §2.2.2, the K function encompasses the MDL principle, and therefore computes a
quantification of Ockham’s razor. However, the K formulation of Ockham’s razor highlights a
property that other formulations overlook: that Ockham’s razor is relative to the size of the
explanandum and the number of times a given theory or explanation can be used. For a given Y and
X and two alternative theories t and t0 that have the same effect H(YjX, t) ¼ H(YjX, t0) and that can
be applied to a number of repetitions nY and n
0
Y, respectively, we have that
log p(t0)
n0Y
,
log p(t)
nY
, K(Yn
0
Y ; X, t0) . K(YnY ; X, t) (2:24)
and similarly for the case in which t ¼ t0 while nX H(X )= n0X H(X0),
n0XH(X
0)
n0Y
,
nXH(X)
nY
, K(Yn
0
Y ; Xn
0
X , t) . K(YnY ; XnX , t): (2:25)
Therefore, the relative epistemological value of the simplicity of an explanans, i.e. Ockham’s razor, is
modulated by the number of times that the explanans can be applied to the explanandum.
2.3.2. Prediction is more costly than explanation, but preferable to it.
The K function can be used to quantify either explanatory or predictive efficiency. The expected (average)
explanatory or predictive efficiency of an explanans with regard to an explanandum is measured when
the terms of the K function are entropies, i.e. expectation values of uncertainties. If instead the
explanandum is an event that has already occurred and that carries information 2logP(Y ¼ y), K
quantifies the value of an explanation, whose information cost includes the surprisal of explanatory
conditions 2logP(X ¼ x) and the complexity of the theory linking such conditions to the event,
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2logP(T ¼ t). Inference to the best explanation and/or model is, in both these cases, driven by the
maximization of K.
If instead it is the explanans, that is pre-determined and fixed, then its predictive power is quantified
by how divergent its predictions are relative to observations. To any extent that observations do not
match predictions, the observed and predicted distributions will have a non-zero informational
divergence, which quantifies the extra amount of information that would be needed to ‘adjust’ the
predictions to make them match the observations. It follows that, indicating with the tilde sign the
predictive theory, we can calculate an ‘adjusted’ K as
Kadj ¼ Kobs D(YjX, tkYjX, ~t) h
H(Y)
(2:26)
in which Kobs ¼ kobsh ¼ K(Y; X, t) is the K observed, and D(  ) is the Kullback–Leibler divergence
between the observed and the predicted distribution (proof in appendix C). Since
D(YjX, tkYjX, ~t)  0, Kadj  Kobs, with equality corresponding to perfect fit between observations and
predictions. An analogous formula could be derived for the case in which the explanandum is a
sequence, in which case the distance would be calculated following methods suggested in §3.3.3.
Now, note that the observed K is the explanatory K, and therefore is always greater or equal to the
predictive K for individual observations. When evidence cumulates, then the explanans of an
explanatory K is likely to expand, reducing the cumulative K (§3.3). Replacing a ‘flexible’ explanation
with a fixed one avoids these latter cumulative costs, allowing a fixed explanans to be applied to a
larger number of cases nY, with no cumulative increase in its complexity.
Therefore, predictive knowledge is simply a more generalized, unchanging form of explanatory
knowledge. As intuition would suggests, prediction can never yield more knowledge than a post hoc
explanation for a given event (e.g. an experimental outcome). However, predictive knowledge
becomes cumulatively more valuable to the extent that it allows to explain, with no changes, a larger
number of events, backwards or forwards in time.
2.3.3. Causation entails correlation and is preferable to it
Properties of the K function also suggests why the knowledge we gain from uncovering a cause–effect
relation is often, but not always, more valuable than that derived from a mere correlation. Definitions of
causality have a long history of subtle philosophical controversies [16], but no definition of causality can
dispense with counterfactuals and/or with assuming that manipulating present causes can change future
effects [17]. The difference between a mere correlation and a causal relation can be formalized as the
difference between two types of conditional probabilities, P(Y ¼ yjX ¼ x) and P(Y ¼ yjdo(X ¼ x)),
where ‘do(X ¼ x)’ is a shorthand for ‘Xjdo(X ¼ x)’ and the ‘do’ function indicates the manipulation of a
variable. In general, correlation without causation entails P(Y ¼ y)  P(Y ¼ yjX ¼ x) and P(Y ¼ y) ¼
P(Y ¼ yjdo(X ¼ x)) whereas causation entails P(Y ¼ y)  P(Y ¼ yjX ¼ x)  P(Y ¼ yjdo(X ¼ x)).
If knowledge is exclusively correlational, then K(Y; X ¼ x, t) . 0 and K(Y; do(X ¼ x), t) ¼ 0, otherwise
K(Y; X ¼ x, t) . 0 and K(Y; do(X ¼ x), t) . 0. Hence, all else being equal, the knowledge attainable via
causation is larger under a broader set of conditions. Moreover, note that in the correlational case
knowledge is only attained once an external input of information is obtained, which has an
informational cost nYH(X ) . 0. In the causal case, instead, the input has no informational cost, i.e.
H(Xjdo(X ¼ x)) ¼ 0, because there is no uncertainty about the value of X, at least to the extent that the
manipulation of the variable is successful. However, the explanans is expanded by an additional
tdo(X¼x), which is the description length of the methodology to manipulate the value of X. Therefore,
the value of causal knowledge is defined as
K(Y; t, tdo(X¼x)) ¼ nYH(Y) nYH(YjX, t)
nYH(Y)log p(t)log p(tdo(X¼x)) ;
H(Y)H(YjX, t)
H(Y)þlog p(tdo(X¼x))log p(t)
nY
: (2:27)
It follows that there is always an nY [ N such that K(Y
nY ; t, tdo(X¼x)) . K(Yn

Y ; Xn

Y , t). Specifically,
assuming t to be constant, causal knowledge is superior to correlational knowledge when
nY . log p(tdo(X¼x))=H(X).
2.3.4. Knowledge growth requires lossy information compression
Both theoretical and physical arguments suggest that K is maximized when t is minimized (§2.2).
A simple calculation shows that such minimization must eventually consist in the encoding of
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concisely described patterns, even if such patterns offer an incomplete account of the explanandum,
because otherwise knowledge cannot grow indefinitely.
Let t be a theory that is not encoding a relation between RVs X and Y, but merely lists all possible (x, y)
pairs of elements from the respective alphabets, i.e. x [ X and y [ Y. To take the simplest possible
example, let each element x [ X correspond to one element of y [ Y. Clearly, such t would always
yield H(YjX, t) ¼ 0, but its description length will grow with the factorial of the size of the alphabet.
Indicating with s the size of the two alphabets, which in our example have the same length, the size of t
would be proportional to log(s!). As the size of the alphabet grows, knowledge declines because
lim
s!þ1K(Y; X, t) ¼ lims!þ1
nYH(Y)
nYH(Y)þ nXH(X)þ log (s!) ¼ 0 (2:28)
independent of the probability distribution of Y andX. Therefore, as the explanandum is expanded (i.e. its
total information and/or complexity grows), knowledge rapidly decreases, unless t is something other
than a listing of (x, y) pairs. In other words, knowledge cannot grow unless t consists in a relatively
short description of some pattern that exploits a redundancy. The knowledge cost of a finite level of
error or missing information H(YjX, t) . 0 will soon be preferable to an exceedingly complex t.
2.3.5. Decline with distance in time, space and/or explanans
Everyone’s experience of the physical world suggests that our ability to predict future states of empirical
phenomena tends to become less accurate the more ‘distant’ the phenomena are from us, in time or space.
Perhaps less immediately obvious, the same applies to explanations: the further back we try to go in time,
the harder it becomes to connect the present state of phenomena to past events. These experiences
suggest that any spatio-temporal notion of ‘distance’ is closely connected to the information-theoretic
notion of ‘divergence’. In other words, our perception that a distance in time or space separates us
from objects or events is cognitively intertwined, if not indeed equivalent, to our diminished ability
to access and process information about those objects or events and, therefore, to our knowledge
about them.
One of the most remarkable properties of K is that it expresses how knowledge changes with
informational distances between systems. It can be shown that, under most conditions in which a
system contains knowledge, divergence in any component of the system will lead to a decline of K
that can be described by a simple exponential function of the form
K(Y0; X0, t0) ¼ K(Y; X, t) Ald (2:29)
in which A is an arbitrary basis, Y0, X0, t0 is a system having an overall distance (i.e. informational
divergence) d from Y, X, t, and l  d ¼ dYlY þ dXlX þ dt1lt1 þ dt2lt2 þ    þ dtllt1 defines the decline
rate (proof in appendix D).
2.3.6. Knowledge has an optimal resolution
Accuracy of measurement is a special case of the general informational concept of resolution, quantifiable
as the number of bits that are available to describe explanandum and explanans. It can be shown both
analytically and empirically that any system Y, X, t is characterized by a unique optimal resolution
that maximizes K (the full argument is offered in appendix E).
We may start by noticing how, even if empirical data is assumed to be measurable to infinite accuracy
(against one of the postulates in §2.2.1), the resulting K value will be inversely proportional to
measurement accuracy, unless special conditions are met. When K is measured on a continuous,
normal and quantized random variable YD (§2.2.2), to the limit of infinite accuracy only one of two
values is possible,
lim
n!1K(Y
D; X, t) ¼ limn!1
h(Y)þnh(YjX, t)n
h(Y)þnþHðXÞlog pðtÞ ¼ 0
limn!1 h(Y)þnh(Y)þnþHðXÞlog pðtÞ ¼ 1
(
(2:30)
with h(  ) representing Shannon’s differential entropy function. The upper limit in equation (2.30) occurs
if and when h(YjX, t). 0, i.e. by assumption there is a non-zero residual uncertainty that needs to be
measured. When this is the case, then the two information terms n brought about by the quantization
cancel each other out in the numerator (because the explanandum and the residual error are
necessarily measured at the same resolution). This is the typical case of empirical knowledge. The
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lower limit in equation (2.30) presupposes a priori that h(YjX, t) ¼ 0, i.e. the explanandum is perfectly
known via the explanans and there is no residual error to be quantized. This case is only represented
by logico-deductive knowledge.
We can define empirical systems as intermediate cases, i.e. cases that have a non-zero conditional
entropy and have a finite level of resolution. We can show (see appendix E) that all empirical systems
have ‘K-optimal’ resolutions aY and a

X, such that
K(Ya

Y ; Xa

X , t) . K(YaY ; XaX , t)8aY = aY, aX = aX: (2:31)
As the resolution increases, K will increase up to a maximal value and then decline.
A system’s optimal resolution is partially determined by the shape of the relation between
explanandum and explanans in ways that are likely to be system-specific. Two simulations in figure 5
illustrate how both K and H(Y )K may vary depending on resolution.
The dependence of K on resolution reflects its status as a measure of entropic efficiency (§2.2.3) and
entails that, to compare systems for which the explanandum is measured to different levels of accuracy,
the K value needs to be rescaled. Such rescaling can be attained rather simply, by multiplying the value of
K by the entropy of the corresponding explanandum,
H(Y) K(Y; X, t): (2:32)
The resulting product quantifies in absolute terms how many bits are extracted from the
explanandum by the explanans.
3. Results
This section will illustrate, with practical examples, how the tools developed so far can be used to answer
meta-scientific questions. Each of the questions is briefly introduced by a problem statement, followed by
the answer, which comprises a mathematical equation, an explanation and one or more examples. Most
of the examples are offered as suggestions of potential applications of the theory, and the specific results
obtained should not be considered conclusive.
3.1. How much knowledge is contained in a theoretical system?
Problem: Unlike empirical knowledge, which is amenable to errors that can be verified against
experiences, knowledge derived from logical and deductive processes conveys absolute certainty. It
might therefore seem impossible to compare the knowledge yield of two different theories, such as
two mathematical theorems. The problem is made even deeper by the fact that any logico-deductive
system is effectively a tautology, i.e. a system that derives its own internal truths from a set of a priori
axioms. How can we quantify the knowledge contained such a system?
Answer: The value of theoretical knowledge is quantified as
K ¼ h (3:1)
in which K corresponds to equation (2.1) and h to equation (2.8).
Explanation: Logico-deductive knowledge, like all other forms of knowledge, ultimately consists in the
encoding of patterns. Mathematical knowledge, for example, is produced by revealing previously
unnoticed logical connections between a statement with uncertainty H(Y ) and another statement,
which may or may not have uncertainty H(X ) (depending on whether X has been proven, postulated
or conjectured), via a set of passages described in a proof t. The latter consists in the derivation of
identities, creating an error-free chain of connections such that P(YjX, t) ¼ 1.
When the proof of the theorem is correct, the effect component k in equation (2.6), is always equal to
one, yielding equation (3.1). However, when the chain of connections t is replaced with a t0 at a distance
dt . 0 from it, k is likely to be zero, because even minor modifications of t (for example, changing a
passage in the proof of a theorem) break the chain of identities and invalidate the conclusion. This is
equivalent to the case lt 1. Therefore, the reproducibility (§3.4) of mathematical knowledge, as it is
embodied in a theorem, is either perfect or null,
Kr ¼ K if dt ¼ 0, Kr ¼ 0 otherwise: (3:2)
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(a)
(b)
Figure 5. Illustrative example of how K varies in relation to the resolution measured for Y and X, depending on the shape of the pattern encoded. The figures and all the calculations were derived from a simulated dataset,
in which the pattern linking explanandum to explanans was assumed to have noise with uniform distribution, as described in the top-left plot of each panel. Black line: entropies and K values calculated by maximum-
likelihood method (i.e. counting frequencies in each bin). Red line: entropies and K values calculated using the ‘shrink’ method described in [18] (the R code used to generate the figures is provided in electronic
supplementary material). Note how the value of K and its rescaled version H(Y )K have a unique maximum.
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Alternative valid proofs, however, might also occur, and their K value will be inversely proportional
to their length, since a shorter proof yields a higher h.
Once a theorem is proven, its application will usually not require invoking the entire proof t. In K,
we can formalize this fact by letting t be replaced by a single symbol encoding the nature of the
relationship itself. The entropy of t will in this case be minimized to that of a small set of symbols, e.g.
f¼,=,., , . . .g. In such case, the value of the knowledge obtained will be primarily determined by nY,
which is the number of times that the theorem will be invoked and used. This leads to the general
conclusion that the value of a theory is inversely related to its complexity and directly related to the frequency of its use.
3.1.1. Example: The proof of Fermat’s last theorem.
Fermat’s last theorem (henceforth, FLT) states that there is no solution to the equation an þ bn ¼ cn when
all terms are positive integers and n . 2. The French mathematician Pierre de Fermat (1607–1665)
claimed to have proven such statement, but his proof was never found. In 1995, Andrew Wiles
published a proof of FLT, winning a challenge that had engaged mathematicians for three centuries
[19]. How valuable was Wiles’ contribution?
We can describe the explanandum of FLT as a binary question: ‘does an þ bn ¼ cn have a solution’? In
absence of any proof t, the answer can only be obtained by calculating the result for any given set of
integers [a, b, c, n]. Let nY be the total plausible number of times that this result could be calculated.
Of course, we cannot estimate this number exactly, but we are assured that this number is an integer
(because a calculation is either made or not), and that it is finite (because the number of individuals,
human or otherwise, who have, will, or might do calculations is finite). Therefore, the explanandum is
nYH(Y ). For simplicity, we might assume that in absence of any proof, individuals making the
calculations are genuinely agnostic about the result, such that H(Y ) ¼ 1.
Indicating with t the maximally succinct (i.e. maximally compressed) description of this proof, the
knowledge yielded by it is
K(YnY ; t) ¼ nYH(Y)
nYH(Y) log p(t) ;
1
1 log p(t)
nY
: (3:3)
Here we assume that any input is contained in the proof t. The information size of the latter is
certainly calculable in principle, since, in its most complete form, it will consist in an algorithm that
derives the result from a small set of axioms and operations.
Wiles’ proof of FLT is over 100 pages long and is based on highly advanced mathematical concepts
that were unknown in Fermat’s times. This suggests that Fermat’s proof (assuming that it existed and was
correct) was considerably simpler and shorter than Wiles’. Mathematicians are now engaged in the
challenge of discovering such a simple proof.
How would a new, simpler proof compare to the one given by Wiles? Indicating this simpler proof
with t0 and ignoring nY because it is constant and independent of the proof, the maximal gain in
knowledge is
K(Y; t0) K(Y; t) ¼ 1
1log p(t0)
1
1 log p(t) ¼
log p(t) (log p(t0))
(1 log p(t0))(1 log p(t)) 
log p(t0) log p(t)
log p(t0) log p(t) : (3:4)
Equation (3.4) reflects the maximal gain in knowledge obtained by devising a simpler, shorter proof of a
previously proven theorem.
Given two theorems addressing different questions, in the more general case, the difference in
knowledge yield will depend on the lengths of the respective proofs as well as the number of
computations that each theorem allows to be spared. The general formula is, indicating with Y0 and t0
an explanandum and explanans different from Y and t,
K(Y0; t0) K(Y; t) ¼ n log p(t
0) n0 log p(t)
(n0  log p(t0))(n log p(t)) : (3:5)
3.2. How much knowledge is contained in an empirical system?
Problem: Science is at once a unitary phenomenon and highly diversified and complex one. It is unitary in
its fundamental objectives and in general aspects of its procedures, but it takes a myriad different forms
when it is realized in individual research fields, whose diversity of theories, methodologies, practices,
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sociologies and histories mirrors that of the phenomena being investigated. How can we compare the
knowledge obtained in different fields, about different subject matters?
Answer: The knowledge produced by a study, a research field, and generally a methodology is
quantified as
K ¼ k  h (3:6)
in which K is given by equation (2.1), k by equation (2.7) and h by equation (2.8).
Explanation: Knowledge entails a reduction of uncertainty, attained by the processing of stored
information by means of an encoded procedure (an algorithm, a ‘theory’, a ‘methodology’).
Equation (3.6) quantifies the efficiency with which uncertainty is reduced. This is a scale-free,
system-specific property. The system is uniquely defined by a combination of explanandum,
explanans and theory, the information content of which is subject to physical constraints. Such
physical constraints ensure that, among other properties, every system Y, X, t has an optimal
resolution, non-zero and non-infinite, and therefore a unique identifiable value K (§2.3.6). As
discussed in §2.3.6, this quantity can also be rescaled to K  H(Y ), which gives the total net
number of bits that are extracted from the explanandum by the explanans. Since k  1, theoretical
knowledge is typically, although not necessarily always, larger than empirical knowledge.
Equation (3.6) applies to descriptive knowledge as well as correlational or causal knowledge, as
examples below illustrate.
3.2.1. Example 1: The mass of the electron
Decades of progressively accurate measurements have led to a current estimate of the mass of the electron
of me ¼ 9.10938356+11  10231 kg (based on the NIST recommended value [20]), with the error term
representing the standard deviation of normally distributed errors. Since this is a fixed number of
39 significant digits, the explanandum is quantified by the amount of storage required to encode it,
i.e. a string of information content 2logP(Y ¼ y) ¼ 39  log(10), and the residual uncertainty is
quantified by the entropy of the normal distribution of errors with s ¼ 11. These measurements are
obtained by complex methodologies that are in principle quantifiable as a string of inputs and
algorithms, 2log p(x) 2log p(t). However, the case of physical constants is similar to that of a
mathematical theorem, in that the explanans becomes negligible to the extent that the value obtained
can be used in a very large number of subsequent applications. Therefore, we estimate our current
knowledge of the mass of the electron to be
K(me) ¼ 39 log 10 log
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2pe
p
11
39 log 10
1
1 log p(x) log p(t)
nY39 log 10
 0:957 (3:7)
with the last approximation due to the case that the value can be stored and used for a very large nY
times, yielding h  1. More accurate calculations would require estimating the h component, too. In
particular, to compare K(me) to the K value of another constant, the relative frequency of use would
need to be taken into account. The corresponding rescaled value is K(me)  39log 10  124 bits.
Note that the specific value of K depends on the scale or unit in which me is measured. If it is
measured in grams (1023 kg), for example, then K(me) ¼ 0.954. This reflects the fact that units of
measurement are just another definable component of the system: there is no ‘absolute’ value of K,
but solely one that is relative to how the system is defined. The relativity of K may lead to difficulties
when comparing systems that are widely different from each other (§3.8). However, results obtained
comparing systems that are adequately similar to each other are coherent and consistent, as illustrated
in the next paragraph.
We could be tempted to ‘cheat’ by rescaling the value of me to a lower number of digits, in order to
ignore the current measurement error. For example, we could quantify knowledge for the mass
measured to 36 significant digits only (which is likely to cover over three standard deviations of
errors, and therefore over 99% of possible values). By doing so, we would obtain K(me)  1,
suggesting that at that level of accuracy, we have virtually perfect knowledge of the mass of the
electron. This is indeed the case: we have virtually no uncertainty about the value of me in the
first few dozen significant digits. However, note that the rescaled value of K is K(me)  36 log10 ¼
119.6 bits. Therefore, by lowering the resolution, our knowledge increased in relative but not in
absolute terms.
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It should be emphasized that we are measuring here the knowledge value of the mass of the electron
in the narrowest possible sense, i.e. by restricting the system to the mass itself. However, the knowledge
we derive by measuring (describing) phenomena such as a physical constant has value also in a broader
context, in its role as an input required to know other phenomena, as the next example illustrates.
3.2.2. Example 2: Predicting an eclipse
The total solar eclipse that occurred in North America on 21 August 2017 (henceforth, E2017) was
predicted with a spatial accuracy of 1–3 km, at least in publicly accessible calculations [21]. This error
is mainly due to irregularities in the Moon’s surface and, to a lesser extent, to irregularities of the
shape of the Earth. Both sources of error can be reduced further with additional information and
calculations (and thus a longer explanans), but we will limit our analysis to this estimate and
therefore assume an average prediction error of 4 km2.
What is the value of the explanans for this knowledge? The theory component of the explanans
consists in calculations based on the JPL DE405 solar system ephemeris, obtained via numerical
integration of 33 equations of motion, derived from a total of 21 computations [22]. In the words of
the authors, these equations are deemed to be ‘correct and complete to the level of accuracy of the
observational data’ [22], which means that this t can be used for an indefinite number nY of
computations, suggesting that we can assume 2logp(t)/nY  0.
The input is in this case a defined object of information content H(X ) ¼ 2logp(x). It contains 98
values of initial conditions, physical constants and parameters, measured to up to 20 significant digits,
plus 21 auxiliary constants used to correct previous data, and the radii of 297 asteroids [22].
Assuming for simplicity that on average these inputs take five digits, we estimate the total
information of the input to be at least (98 þ 21 þ 297)  5  log10  6910 bits. The accuracy of
predictions is primarily determined by the accuracy of measurement of these parameters, which
moreover are in many cases subject to revision. Therefore, in this case nX/nY . 0, and the value of
H(X ) is less appropriately neglected. Nonetheless, we will again assume for simplicity that nY 	 nX
and thus h  1.
Therefore, since the surface of the Earth is approximately 510 072 000 km2, we estimate our
astronomical knowledge to be
K(E2017; X, t)  log (510 072 000) log (4)
log (510 072 000)
¼ 0:931 (3:8)
and a rescaled value of K(E2017; X, t)  log (510 072 000) ¼ 26.9261.
Therefore, the value of K for predicting eclipses is smaller than that obtained for physical constants
(§3.2.1). However, our analysis is not complete and it still over-estimates the K value of predicting an
eclipse for at least two reasons. First, because the assumption of a negligible explanans for eclipse
prediction is a coarser approximation than for physical constants, since physical constant are required
to predict eclipses, and not vice versa. Secondly, and most importantly, our knowledge about eclipses
is susceptible to declining with distance between explanans and explanandum. This is in stark
contrast to the case of physical constants, which are, by definition, unchanging in time and space,
such that ly  0.
What is l in the case of eclipses? We will not examine here the possible effects of distance in methods,
and we will only estimate the knowledge loss rate over time. We can do so by taking the most distant
prediction made using the JPL DE405 ephemeris for a total solar eclipse: the one that will occur on 26
April AD 3000 [21]. The estimated error is approximately 7.88 of longitude, which at the predicted
latitude of peak eclipse (21.18N, 18.48W) corresponds to an error of approximately 815 km in either
direction. Therefore, the estimated K for predicting an eclipse 982 years from now is
K(E3000; X, t)  log (510 072 000) 2 log (815)
log (510 072 000)
¼ 0:331: (3:9)
Solving K(E3000; X, t) ¼ K(E2017; X, t)  22l982 yields a knowledge loss rate of
lt ¼ 0:0015 (3:10)
per year. Which corresponds to a knowledge half life of l21  667 years. Therefore our knowledge
about the position of eclipses, based on the JPL DE405 methodology, is halved for every 667 years of
time-distance to predictions.
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3.3. How much progress is a research field making?
Problem: Knowledge is a dynamic quantity. Research fields are known to be constantly evolving, splitting
and merging [23]. As evidence cumulates, theories and methodologies are modified, enlarged or
simplified, and may be extended to encompass new explananda and explanantia, or conversely may
be re-defined to account more accurately for a narrower set of phenomena. To what extent do these
dynamics determine scientific progress?
Answer: Progress occurs if and only if the following condition is met:
nXH(X
0) log p(t0) , nYH(Y) k
0  k
kh
(3:11)
in which H(X0) ; DH(X ) and 2logp(t0) ; 2Dlogp(t) are expansions or reductions of explanantia, and
k ¼ (H(Y ) 2 H(YjX, t))/H(Y ), k0 ¼ (H(Y ) 2 H(YjX, X0, t, t0))/H(Y ), h ¼ nYH(Y )/(nYH(Y ) þ nXH(X ) 2
log p(t)) (see appendix F).
Explanation: Knowledge occurs when progressively larger explananda are accounted for by relatively
smaller explanantia. This is the essence of the process of consilience, which has been recognized for a
long time as the fundamental goal of the scientific enterprise [24]. Consilience drives progress at all
levels of generality of scientific knowledge. At the research frontier, where new research fields are
being created by identifying new explananda and/or new combinations of explanandum and
explanans, K grows by a process of ‘micro-consilience’. A ‘macro-consilience’ may be said to occur
when knowledge-containing systems are extended and unified across fields, disciplines and entire
domains. Equation (3.11) quantifies the conditions for consilience to occur both at the micro- and
macro-level.
The inequality (3.11) is satisfied under several conditions. First, when the explanantia X0 and/or t0
produce a sufficiently large improvement in the effect, from k to k0. Second, equation (3.11) is satisfied
even when explanatory power is lost, i.e. when k0  k, if DH(X ) 2 Dlog p(t) is sufficiently negative.
This entails that input, theory or methodology are being reduced or simplified. Finally, if DH(X ) 2
Dlog p(t) ¼ 0, condition (3.11) is satisfied provided that k0 . k, which would occur by expansion of the
explanandum. In all cases, the conditions for consilience are modulated by the extent of application of
the theories themselves, quantified by the nX and nY indices.
3.3.1. Example 1: Evolutionary models of reproductive skew
Reproductive skew theory is an ambitious attempt to explain reproductive inequalities within animal
societies according to simple principles derived from kin selection theory ([25] and references within).
In its earliest formulation, reproductive skew was predicted to be determined by a ‘transactional’
dynamic between dominant and subordinate individuals, according to the condition,
pmin ¼ xs  r(k  xd)
k(1 r) (3:12)
in which pmin is the minimum proportion of reproduction required by the subordinate to stay, xs and xd
are the number of offspring that the subordinate and dominant, respectively, would produce if breeding
independently, r is the genetic relatedness between subordinate and dominant and k is the productivity
of the group. The theory was later expanded to include an alternative ‘compromise’ model approach, in
which skew was determined by direct intra-group conflict. Subsequent elaborations of this theory have
extended its range of possible conditions and assumptions, leading to a proliferation of models whose
overall explanatory value has been increasingly questioned [25].
We can use equation (3.11) to examine the conditions under which introducing a new parameter or a
new model would constitute net progress within reproductive skew theory, using data from a
comprehensive review [25]. In particular, we will focus on one of the earliest and most stringent
predictions of transactional models, which concerns the correlation between skew and dominant-
subordinate genetic relatedness. Contradicting earlier reported success [26], empirical tests in
populations of 21 different species failed to support unambiguously transactional models in all but
one case (data taken from table 2.2 in [25]).
Since this analysis is intended as a mere illustration, we will make several simplifying assumptions.
First, we will assume that all parameters in the model are measurable to two significant digits, and that
their prior expected distributions are uniform (in other words, any group from any species may exhibit a
skew and relatedness ranging from 0.00 to 0.99, and individual and group productivities ranging from 0
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to 99). Therefore, we assume that each of these parameters has an information content equal to 2log 10 ¼
6.64 bits. Second, we will assume that the data reported by [25] are a valid estimate of the average success
rate of reproductive skew theory in any non-tested species. Third, we will assume that all of the
parameters relevant to the theory are measured with no error. For example, we assume that for any
organism in which a ‘success’ for the theory is reported, reproductive skew is explained or predicted
exactly. Fourth, we will assume that the extent of applications of skew theory, i.e. nY, is sufficiently
large to make the t component (which contains a description of equation (3.12) as well as any other
condition necessary to make reproductive skew predictions work) negligible. These assumptions make
our analysis extremely conservative, leading to an over-estimation of K values.
Indicating with Y, Xs, Xd, Xr, Xk the values of pmin, xs, xd, r, k in equation (3.12), we obtain the value
corresponding to the K of transactional models
k ¼
2 log 10 20
21
2 log 10
2 log 10
¼ 1
21
¼ 0:048 (3:13)
and
h ¼ H(Y)
H(Y)þH(Xs)þH(Xd)þH(Xr)þH(Xk) log p(t) ¼
1
5 log p(t)
nY2 log 10
 0:2: (3:14)
Plugging these values in equation (3.11) and re-arranging, we derive the minimal amount of increase
in explanatory power that would justify adding a new parameter input X0,
k0 . k 1þ nXhH(X
0)
nYH(Y)
 
¼ 0:048 1þ 0:2H(X
0)
6:64
 
: (3:15)
This suggests, for example, that if X0 is a new parameter measured to two significant digits, with H(X0) ¼
2log 10, adding it to equation (3.12) would represent theoretical progress if k0 . 1.2k, in other words if it
increased the explanatory power of the theory by 20%. If instead X0 represented the choice between
transactional theory and a new model then, assuming conservatively that H(X0) ¼ 1, we have k0 .
1.03k, suggesting that any improvement above 3% would justify it.
Did the introduction of a single ‘compromise’ model represent a valuable extension of transactional
theory? The informational cost of expanding transactional theory consists not only in the equations t0 that
need to be added to the theory, but also in the additional binary variable X0 that determines the choice
between the two models for each new species to which the theory is applied. We will assume
conservatively that the choice equals one bit. According to Nonacs & Hager [25], compromise models
were successfully tested in 2 out of the 21 species examined. Therefore, the k ¼ 3/21 ¼ 0.14 attained
by adding a compromise model amply compensated for the corresponding increased complexity of
reproductive skew theory.
The analysis above refers to results for tests of reproductive skew theory across groups within
populations. When comparing the average skew of populations, conversely, transactional models were
compatible with virtually all of the species tested, especially with regard to the association of
relatedness with reproductive skew [25]. In this case, if we interpret these data as suggesting that k 
1, i.e. that transactional models are compatible with every species encountered, then progress within
the field (the theory) could only be achieved by simplifying equation (3.12). This could be obtained by
removing or recoding the parameters with the lowest predictive power, or by deriving the theory in
question from more general theories. The latter is what the authors of the review did, by suggesting
that the cross-population success of the theory is explainable more economically in terms of kin
selection theory, from which these models are derived [25].
These results are merely preliminary and likely to over-estimate the benefits of expanding skew theory.
In addition to the conservative assumptions made above, we have assumed that only one transactional
model and one compromise model exist, whereas in reality several variants of these models have been
produced, which entails that the choice X0 is not simply binary, and therefore H(X0) is likely to be larger
than 1. Moreover, we have assumed that the choice between transactional and compromise models is
made a priori, for example based on some measurable property of organisms that tells beforehand which
type of model applies. If the choice is made after the variables are known then the costs of this choice
have to be accounted for, with potentially disastrous consequences (§3.6).
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3.3.2. Example 2: gender differences in personality factors
In 2005, psychologist Janet Hyde proposed a ‘gender similarity hypothesis’, according to which men and
women are more similar than different on most (but not all) psychological variables [27]. According to
her review of the literature, human males and females exhibit average differences that, for most measured
personality factors, are of small magnitude (i.e. Cohen’s d less than or equal to 0.35). Assuming that these
traits are normally distributed within each gender, this finding implies that the empirical distributions of
male and female personality factors overlap by more than 85% in most cases.
The gender similarity hypothesis was challenged by Del Giudice et al. [28], on the basis that, even
assuming that the distributions of individual personality factors do overlap substantially, the joint
distribution of these factors might not. For example, if Mahalanobis distance D, which is the
multivariate equivalent of Cohen’s d, was applied to 15 psychological factors measured on a large
sample of adult males and females, the resulting effect was large (D ¼ 1.49), suggesting an overlap of
30% or less [28] (figure 6a).
The multivariate approach proposed by Del Giudice was criticized by Hyde primarily for being
‘uninterpretable’ [29], because it is based on a distance in 15-dimensional space, calculated from the
discriminant function. This suggests that such a measure is intended to maximize the difference
between groups. Indeed, Mahalanobis D will always be larger than the largest unidimensional
Cohen’s d included in its calculation (figure 6a).
The K function offers an alternative approach to examine the gender differences vs similarities
controversy, using simple and intuitive calculations. With K, we can quantify directly the amount of
knowledge that we gain, on average, about an individual’s personality by knowing their gender.
Since most people self-identify as male and female in roughly similar proportions, knowing the
gender differences in personality factors
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Figure 6. Uni- and multivariate analyses of gender differences in personality factors. (a) Cohen’s d and Mahalanobis D calculated
in [28]. (b) K values calculated on a dataset of one million individuals, reproduced using the covariance matrices for males and
females estimated in [28]. Orange bar: average of unidimensional K values. Blue bar: Kmd, calculated assuming that all factors
are orthogonal, as in equation (3.16). The number above the blue bar represents the rescaled values H(Y )Kmd. For further
details, see text.
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gender of an individual corresponds to an input of one bit. In the most informative scenario, males and
females would be entirely separated along any given personality factor, and knowing gender would
return exactly one bit along any dimension. Therefore, we can test to what extent the gender factor is
informative by setting up a one-bit information in each of the explananda: we divide the population
in two groups, corresponding to values above and below the median for each dimension.
The resulting measure, which we will call ‘multi-dimensional K’ are psychologically realistic and
intuitively interpretable and are calculated as
Kmd ;
Pz
i¼1H(Yi)
Pz
i¼1H(YijX, tYijX)Pz
i¼1H(Yi)þH(X)
Pz
i¼1
log p(tYi jX )
nY
(3:16)
in which z is the number of dimensions considered and tYijX is the theory linking gender to each
dimension i.
Note that, whereas the maximum value attainable by the unidimensional K is 1/2, that of Kmd is 15/
16 ¼ 0.938. This value illustrates how, as the explanandum is expanded to new dimensions, Kmd could
approach indefinitely the value of 1, value that would entail that input about gender yields complete
information about personality. Whether it does so, and therefore the extent to which applying the
concept of gender to multiple dimensions represents progress, is determined by conditions in (3.11).
To illustrate the potential applications of these measures, the values of K, average K, as well as Kmd
were calculated from a dataset (N¼106) simulated using the variance and covariance of personality
factors estimated by [28,30]. All unidimensional personality measures were split in lower and upper
50% percentile, yielding one bit of potentially knowable information. In Kmd, these were then
recombined, yielding a 15-bit total explanandum.
Figure 6b reports results of this analysis. As expected, the unidimensional K values are closely
correlated with their corresponding Cohen’s d values (figure 6a,b, black bars). However, the multi-
dimensional K value offers a rather different picture from that of Mahalanobis D. Kmd is considerably
smaller than the largest unidimensional effect measured, and is in the range of the second-largest
effect. Indeed, unlike Mahalanobis D, Kmd is somewhat intermediate in magnitude, although larger
than a simple average (given by the orange bar in figure 6b).
Therefore, we conclude that the overall knowledge conferred by gender about the 15 personality
factors together is comparable to some of the larger, but not the largest, values obtained on individual
factors. This is a more directly interpretable comparison of effects, which stems from the unique
properties of K.
We can also calculate the absolute number of bits that are gained about an individual’s personality by
knowing a person’s gender. For the unidimensional variables, where we assumed H(Y ) ¼ 1, this is
equivalent to the K values shown. For the multi-dimensional Kmd, however, we have to multiply by
15, obtaining 0.28 (figure 6b). This value is larger than the largest unidimensional K value of
approximately 0.08, and suggests that, at least among the 15 dimensions considered, receiving one bit
of input about an individual’s gender allows to save at least one-quarter of a bit in predicting their
personality.
These results are intended as mere illustrations of the potential utility of the methods proposed. Such
potential was under-exploited in this particular case, because the original data were not available, and
therefore the analysis was based on a re-simulation of data derived from estimated variances and co-
variances. Therefore, this analysis inherited the assumptions of normality and linear covariance that
are necessary but limiting components of traditional multivariate analyses, and were a source of
criticism for data on gender differences too [29].
Unlike ordinary multivariate analyses, a K analysis requires no distributional assumptions. If it were
conducted on a real dataset about gender, the analysis might reveal nonlinear structures in personality
factors, and/or identify the optimal level of resolution at which each dimension of personality ought to
be measured (§2.3.6). This would yield a more accurate answer concerning how much knowledge about
people’s personality is gained by knowing their gender.
3.3.3. Example 3: Does cumulative evidence support a hypothesis?
The current tool of choice to assess whether the aggregate evidence of multiple studies supports an
empirical hypothesis is meta-analysis, in which effect sizes of primary studies are standardized and
pooled in a weighted summary [13]. The K function may offer a complementary tool in the form of a
cumulative K, Kcum. This is conceptually analogous to the Kmd described above but, instead of
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assuming that the various composing explananda lie on orthogonal dimensions and the explanans is
fixed, it assumes that both explanandum and explanans lie on single dimensions, and their entropy
results from a mixture of different sources.
It can be shown that, for a set of RVs Y1, Y2 . . . Ym with probability distributions
pY1 (  ), pY2 (  ) . . . pYm (  ), the entropy of their mixed distribution
P
wipYi is given by
H
X
im
wipYi
 !
¼
X
im
wiH(Yi)þ
X
im
wiD pYik
X
im
wipYi
 !
; H(Y)þ dY, (3:17)
where the right-hand terms are a notation introduced for convenience, and D(pYik
P
im wipYi ) represents
the Kullback–Leibler divergence between each RV and the mixed distribution.
For sequences, and particularly for those representing the theory t, the mixture operates on an
element-by-element basis. For example, if Ti,p and Tj,p are the RVs representing choice p in ti and tj,
respectively, a mixture of ti and tj will lead to choice p now being represented by a RV Tij,p, say,
which has still uniform distribution and whose alphabet is the union set of the mixed alphabets,
Tij,p ¼ {Ti,p < Tj,p}.
Remembering that the minimum alphabet size of any element of a t is 2, it can be shown that, if for
example, ti ¼ (ti,1, ti,2 . . . ti,l) and tj ¼ (tj,1, tj,2 . . . tj,m) are two sequences of length l and m with l . m,
their mixture will yield the quantity
tþ dt ; lþ
X
ul
log
jT uj
2
(3:18)
in which jT uj is the size of the alphabet resulting from the mixture. For the mixing of s theories ft1, t2 . . .
tsg, t will be equal to the description length of the longest t in the set. Indicating the latter with l*, we
have
0  dt  l log sþ 1
2
(3:19)
with the right-hand side equality occurring if the s sequences have equal length and are all different from
each other.
For example, if the methodology ti ¼ (‘randomized’, ‘human’, ‘female’) is mixed with tj ¼ (‘randomized’,
‘human’, ‘male þ female’), the resulting mixture would have composing RVs T1 ¼ f‘randomized’, ‘not’g,
T2 ¼ f‘human’, ‘not’g, T3 ¼ f‘female’, ‘male þ female’, ‘not’g, and its information content would equal
2 log(1/2)2 log(1/2) 2 log(1/3) ¼ 3.58 or equivalently tþ dt ¼ 3þ log (3=2) ¼ 3þ 0:58.
Therefore, the value of the cumulative K is given by
Kcum ;
nY(H(Y)H(YjX, t)þ dY  dYjX,t)
nYH(Y)þ nXH(X)þ tþ nYdY þ nXdX þ dt
(3:20)
in which the d terms represent the average divergences from the mixed expananda or explanatia.
Equation (3.20) is subject to the same conditions of equation (3.11), which will determine whether the
cumulative knowledge (e.g. a cumulative literature) is overall leading to an increase or a decrease of
knowledge.
The peculiarity of equation (3.20) lies in the presence of additional divergence terms, which allow
knowledge to grow or decrease independently of the weighted averages of the measured effects. In
particular, ignoring the repetition terms which are constant,
Kcum  K , dYjX,t  (1 K)dY  K(dX þ dt) (3:21)
with K ¼ (H(Y)H(YjX, t))=(H(Y)þH(X)þ t) constituting the K value obtained by the simple averages
of each term. This property, combined with the presence of a cumulative theory/methodology
component tþ dt that penalizes the cumulation of diverse methodologies, makes Kcum behave rather
differently from ordinary meta-analytical estimates.
Figure 7 illustrates the differences between meta-analysis and Kcum. Like ordinary meta-analysis, Kcum
depends on the within- and between-study variance of effect sizes. Unlike meta-analysis, however, Kcum
decreases if the methodology of aggregated studies is heterogeneous, independent of the statistical
heterogeneity that is observed in the effect sizes (that is, K can decrease even if the effects are
statistically homogeneous). Moreover, Kcum can increase even when all included studies report null
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Figure 7. Comparison between meta-analysis and cumulative K analysis. From left to right, the graph shows the simulated data for two imagined studies (blue and golden, respectively) with different assumptions of
variance and effect size, then the corresponding meta-analytical summary, and then the corresponding K analysis, with values calculated as in equation (3.20). The entropy value, meta-analytical summary effect size or K are
indicated above each corresponding figure. See text for further discussion.
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findings, if the aggregated studies cover different ranges of the explanandum, making the cumulative
explanandum larger.
Note that we have not specified how the weights underlying the mixture are calculated. These may
consist in an inverse-variance weighting, as in ordinary meta-analysis, or could be computed based on
other epistemologically relevant variables, such as the relative divergence of studies’ methodologies.
The latter approach would offer an alternative to the practice of weighting studies by measures of
quality, a practice that used to be common in meta-analysis and has now largely been abandoned due
to its inherent subjectivity.
3.4. How reproducible is a research finding?
Problem: The concept of ‘reproducibility’ is the subject of growing concerns and expanding research
programmes, both of which risk being misled by epistemological confusions of at least two kinds.
The first source of confusion is the conflation of the reproducibility of methods and that of results
[31]. The reproducibility of methods entails that identical results are reproduced if the same data
is used, indicating that data and methods were reported completely and transparently. The
reproducibility of results entails that identical results are obtained if the same methods are applied
to new data. Whereas the former is a relatively straightforward issue to assess and to address, the
latter is a complex phenomenon that has multiple causes that are hard to disentangle. When a
study is reproduced using new data, i.e. sampling from a similar but possibly not identical
population and using similar but not necessarily identical methods, results may differ for reasons
that have nothing to do with flawed methods in the original studies. This is a very intuitive idea,
which, however, struggles to be formally included in analyses of reproducibility. The latter
typically follow the meta-analytical paradigm of assuming that, in absence of research and
publication biases, results of two studies ought to be randomly distributed around a ‘true’
underlying effect.
The second source of confusion comes from treating the concept of reproducibility as a dichotomy—
either a study is reproducible/reproduced or it is not—even though this is obviously a simplification.
A scientific finding may be reproduced to varying degrees, depending on the nature of what is being
reproduced (e.g. is it an empirical datum? A relation between two operationalized concepts?
A generalized theory?) and contingent upon innumerable characteristics of a research which include
not just how the research was conducted and reported, but also by characteristics of the research’s
subject matter and general methodology.
How can we distinguish the reproducibility of methods and results and define them in a single,
continuous measure?
Answer: The relation between a scientific study and one that reproduces it is described by the relation
Kr ¼ KAld (3:22)
in which Kr is the result of a replication study conducted at a study-specific ‘distance’ (information
divergence) given by the inner-product of a vector d : [dY, dX, dt1 , dt2    ] of distances and a vector
l : [lY, lX, lt1 , lt2 . . . ] of corresponding loss rates.
Explanation: A study that attempts to reproduce another study is best understood as a new
system that is at a certain ‘distance’ from the previous one. An identical replication is guaranteed
to occur only if the exact same methods and exact same data are used, in which case the
divergence between the two systems is likely to be zero on all dimensions, and the resulting K
(and corresponding measure of effect size produced by the study’s results) is expected to be
identical. Note that even this is an approximation, since the instruments (e.g. hardware and
software) used to repeat the analyses may be different, and this could in principle generate some
discrepancies.
If attainable at all, a divergence of zero is only really likely to characterize the reproducibility of
methods and is unlikely to occur in the reproducibility of results (in which new data are being
collected). In the latter, different characteristics in the population being sampled (dY), the
measurements or interventions made (dX) and/or other critical choices made in the conduction of the
study (dt) may affect the outcome. Contrary to what is normally assumed in reproducibility studies,
these differences cannot be assumed to exert random and symmetric influences on the result. The
more likely direction of change is one of reduction: divergences in any element of the system,
particularly if not dictated by the objective to increase K, are likely to introduce noise in the system,
thus obfuscating the pattern encoded in the original study.
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Section 2.3.5 showed how the exponential function (3.22) described the decline of a system’s K due to
divergences in subject matter or methodology. In practical terms, a divergence vector will consist in
classifiable, countable differences in components of the methods used and/or characteristics of subject
matter that, based on theory and prior data, are deemed likely to reduce the level of K by some
proportional factor.
Applications of equation (3.22) to individual cases require measuring study-specific divergences in
explanandum and explanans and their corresponding loss rates. However, the universality of the function
in equation (3.22) allows us to derive general, population-level predictions about reproducibility, as the
example below illustrates.
3.4.1. Example: How reproducible is Psychological Science?
The Reproducibility Initiative in Psychology (RIP) was a monumental project in which a consortium of
laboratories attempted to replicate 100 studies taken from recent issues of three main psychology
journals. Results were widely reported in the literature and mass media as suggesting that less than
40% of studies had been replicated, a figure deemed to be disappointingly low and indicative of
significant research and publication biases in the original studies [32]. This conclusion, however, was
questioned on various grounds, including: limitations in current statistical approaches used to predict
and estimate reproducibility (e.g. [33–35]), methodological differences between original and
replication studies [36], variable expertise of the replicators [37] and variable contextual sensitivity of
the phenomena studied [38,39]. The common element behind all these concerns is that the replication
study was not actually identical to the original but diverged in details that affected the results
unidirectionally. This is the phenomenon that equation (3.22) can help to formalize, predict and
estimate empirically.
In theory, each replication study in the RIP could be examined individually using equation (3.22), but
doing so would require field-specific information on the impact that various divergences may have on the
results. This fine-grained analysis is not achievable, at least presently, because the necessary data are not
available. However, we can use equation (3.22) to formulate a general prediction about the shape of the
distribution of results of a reproducibility study, under varying frequencies and impacts of errors.
Figure 8 simulated the distribution of effect sizes (here shown as correlation coefficients derived from
the corresponding K) that would be observed in a set of replication studies, depending on their average
distances d and impacts l from an original or ideal study. Distances were assumed to follow a Poisson
distribution, with a mean of 1, 5 and 20, respectively. The impact of these distances was increased moving
from the top to the bottom row, by assuming the values of l illustrated in the top-most panel. The dotted
vertical line in each plot reports the initial value of K (i.e. the left-hand side of equation (3.22)), whereas
the solid vertical line shows the mean of the distribution of results.
The figure can be given different interpretations. The distances simulated in figure 8 may be
interpreted as between-study differences in the explanandum or input (e.g. cultural differences in the
studied populations), between-study differences in methodological choices, or as study-specific
methodological errors and omissions, or a combination of all three. The dotted line may represent
either the result of the original study or the effect that would be obtained by an idealized study for
which the K is maximal and from which all observed studies are at some distance.
Irrespective of what we assume these distances to consist in, and to the extent that they represent a
loss of information, their frequency and impact profoundly affect the expected distribution of replication
results. The distribution is compact and right-skewed when distances are few and of minor impact (top-
left). As the number of such minor-impact distances grows, the distribution tends to be symmetrical and
bell-shaped (top-right). Indeed, if the number of distances was increased further, the shape would
resemble that of a Gaussian curve (mirroring the behaviour of a Poisson distribution). In such a
(special) case, the distribution of replication results would meet the assumption of symmetrical and
normally distributed errors that current statistical models of reproducibility make. This condition,
however, is a rather extreme case and by no means the most plausible. As the impact of distances
increases in magnitude, the distribution tends to become left-skewed, if distances are numerous, or
bimodal if they are few (bottom-right and bottom-left, respectively).
This suggests that the conditions typically postulated in analyses of reproducibility (i.e. a normal
distribution around the ‘true’ or the ‘average’ effect in a population of studies) are only realized under
the special condition in which between-studies differences, errors or omissions in methodologies are
numerous and of minor impact. However, when important divergences in explanandum or explanans
occur (presumably in the form of major discrepancies in methods used, populations examined etc.),
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the distribution becomes increasingly asymmetrical and concentrated around null results and may either
be left-skewed or bimodal, depending on whether the number of elements subject to divergence is large
or small.
Data from the RIP support these predictions. Before undertaking the replication tests, the authors of
the RIP had classified the studies by level of expertise required to replicate them. As figure 9 illustrates,
replication results of studies that were deemed to require moderate or higher expertise are highly
concentrated around zero, with a small subset of studies exhibiting medium to large effects. This
distribution is markedly different from that of studies that required null or minimal expertise, which
was unimodal instead. Note how the distribution of original results reported by both categories of
studies are, instead, undistinguishable in shape. Additional differences between distributions might be
explained by a classification of the stability of the explanandum or explanans (e.g. the contextual
sensitivity suggested by Van Bavel et al. [39]).
Although preliminary, these results suggest that a significant cause of reproducibility ‘failures’ in the
RIP may have been high-impact divergences in the systems or methodologies employed by the
replicating studies. These divergences may have occurred despite the fact that many authors of the
original studies had contributed to the design of the replication attempts. A significant component of
a scientists’ expertise consists in ‘tacit knowledge’ [40], manifested in correct methodological choices
that are not codified or described in textbooks and research articles, and that are unconsciously
acquired by researchers through practice. Therefore, authors of the original studies might have taken
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Figure 8. Simulated distribution of results of reproducibility studies, under varying conditions of distances (e.g. number of
differences in methodologies), d, and average impact per distance l. The top panel shows how K declines as the number of
divergences increases, depending on different values of l. Panels in the second row show the probability distribution of the
simulated distances (Poisson distributions, with mean 1, 5 and 20, respectively). The nine panels below show the distribution
of correlation coefficients of reproducibility studies under each combination of number of distances and their impact. The
impact is colour coded as in the top panel. For further discussion see text.
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for granted, or unwittingly overlooked, important aspects of their own research design when instructing
the RIP replicators. The latter, even if professionally prepared, might have lacked sufficient expertise
about the systems that are the object of the replication attempt, and may therefore have made ‘tacit
errors’ that neither they or the authors of the original studies were able to document.
It may still be the case that p-hacking and selective publication had affected some of the studies
examined by RIP. However, if research biases were the sole factor leading to low reproducibility, then
the two distributions in figure 9 should look similar. The fact that studies requiring higher level of
expertise are harder to reproduce ought, in retrospect, not to surprise us. It simply suggests the very
intuitive idea that many scientific experiments cannot be successfully conducted by anyone who
simply follows the recipe, but need to be conducted by individuals with high levels of expertise about
the methodology and the phenomena being studied. This fact still raises important questions about
the generalizability of published results and how to improve it, but such questions should be
disentangled as much as possible from questions about the integrity and objectivity of researchers.
3.5. What is the value of a null or negative result?
Problem: How scientists should handle ‘null’ and ‘negative’ results is the subject of considerable
ambiguity and debate. On the one hand, and contrary to what their names might suggest, ‘null’ and
‘negative’ results undoubtedly play an important role in scientific progress, because it is by
cumulation of such results that hypotheses and theories are refuted, allowing progress to be made by
‘theory falsification’, rather than verification, as Karl Popper famously argued [41]. Null and negative
results are especially important in contexts in which multiple independent results are aggregated to
test a single hypothesis, as is done in meta-analysis [42].
On the other hand, as Popper himself had noticed, the falsifiability of a hypothesis is typically
suboptimal, because multiple ‘auxiliary’ assumptions (or, equivalently, auxiliary hypotheses) may not be
controlled for. Moreover, it is intuitively clear that a scientific discovery that leads to useful knowledge is
made when a new pattern is identified, and not merely when a pattern is proved not to subsist.
This is why, if on the one hand there are increasing efforts to counter the ‘file-drawer problem’, on the
other hand there are legitimate concerns that these efforts might generate a ‘cluttered office’ problem, in
which valuable knowledge is drowned in a chaotic sea of uninformative publications of null results [43].
The problem is that the value of null and negative results is context-specific. How can we estimate it?
Answer: The knowledge value of a null or negative result is given by
Knull  hH(Y) log
jT j
jT j  1 (3:23)
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Figure 9. Distributions of correlation coefficients reported by the studies examined in the Reproducibility Initiative in Psychology
[32]. Blue: effect sizes originally reported. Red: results of replications. Numbers report the kurtosis of each distribution.
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rsos
R.
Soc.
open
sci.
6:
181055
29
in which h ¼ H(Y )/(H(T ) þ H(Y ) þ H(T )), Knull is the knowledge gained by the conclusive refutation of
a hypothesis, and jT j is the size of the set of hypotheses being potentially tested (including all unchecked
assumptions) in the study. All else equal, the maximum value of Knull declines rapidly as jT j increases
(figure 10).
Explanation: Section 2.2.1 described knowledge as resulting from the selection of a t [ T , where T is
the a set of possible theories (methodologies) determining a pattern between explanandum and input.
These theories can, as usual, be described by a uniform random variable T. It can be shown that,
because of the symmetry property of the mutual information function,
K(Y; X, T) ¼ K(T; Y, X), (3:24)
i.e. the information that the set of theories contains about the data is equivalent to the information that
the data contains about the theories (see appendix G).
This is indeed how knowledge is attained. A theory t is selected among available alternatives because
it best fits a data YnY , XnX , and ideally maximizes kadj 2 kobs (§2.3.2). The data are obtained by experiment
(or experiences) and the process is what we call learning, as it is embodied in the logic of Bayes’ theorem,
the MDL principle and generally the objective of any statistical inference method. Since no knowledge
(including knowledge about a theory) can be obtained in the absence of a ‘background’ conditioning
theory and methodology, a more accurate representation of an experiment entails the specification of
an unvarying component which we will indicate as m, which quantifies the aspects of the theory and
methodology of an experiment that are not subject to uncertainty, and the component for which
knowledge is sought, the random variable T, which therefore represents the hypothesis or hypotheses
being tested by the experiment. The knowledge attained by the experiment is then given by
K(T; YnY , XnX , m) ¼ h
H(Y)
(H(T)H(TjY, X, m)): (3:25)
It follows that the experiment is maximally informative when H(T ) is as large as possible and H(TjY,
X, m) ¼ 0, that is, when multiple candidate hypotheses are examined and each of them is in one-to-one
correspondence with each of possible states of Y, X.
Real-life experiments depart from this ideal condition in twoways. First, they usually retain uncertainty
about the result, H(TjY, X, m). 0, because multiple alternative hypotheses are compatible with the same
experimental outcome. Second, real experiments usually test no more than one hypothesis at a time. This
entails that H(TjY, X, m) rapidly approaches H(T ), as the size of the alphabet of T increases (see appendix
H). These limitations suggest that, assuming maximally informative conditions in which all tested
hypotheses are equally likely and one hypothesis is conclusively ruled out by the experiment, we have
H(T)H(TjY ¼ y, X ¼ x, m) ¼ log jT j  log (jT j  1), which gives equation (3.23).
As intuition would suggest, even if perfectly conclusive, a null finding is intrinsically less valuable
than its corresponding ‘positive’ one. This occurs because a tested hypothesis is ruled out when the
result is positive as well as when it is negative, and therefore the value quantified in equation (3.23) is
obtained with positive as well as negative results, a condition that we can express formally as K(T; Y,
X, m, T ¼ t1) ¼ K(T; Y, X, m, T ¼ t0). Positive results, however, also yield knowledge about a pattern.
Therefore, whereas a conclusive rejection of a non-null hypothesis yields at most K(T; Y, X, m, T ¼
t0) ¼ h/H(Y ), a conclusive rejection of the null hypothesis in favour of the alternative yields K(T; Y, X,
information value of hypothesis falsification
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Figure 10. Relation between jT j, the total number of hypotheses/assumptions entering a study and the main multiplicative factor
that determines the upper limit to Knull in equation (3.23).
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m, T ¼ t1) þ K(Y; X, t1) . h/H(Y ). Perfect symmetry between ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ results is only
attained in the ideal conditions mentioned above, in which H(TjY, X, m) ¼ 0 and H(T ) ¼ H(Y ), and
therefore each experimental outcome identifies a theory with empirical value and at the same time
refutes other theories. This is the scenario in which ‘perfect’ Popperian falsificationism can operate,
and real-life experiments depart from this ideal in proportion to the number log (jT j  1) of auxiliary
hypotheses that are not addressed by the experiment.
The departure from ideal conditions is especially problematic in biological and social studies that
are testing a fixed ‘null’ hypothesis t0 that predicts K(Y; X, t0) ¼ 0 against a non-specified alternative
t1 for which K(Y; X, t1) . 0. First of all, due to noise and limited sample size, K(Y;X,t0) . 0. This
problem can be substantially reduced by increasing statistical power but can never be fully eliminated,
especially in fields in which large sample sizes and high accuracy (resolution) are difficult or
impossible to obtain. Moreover, and regardless of statistical power, a null result is inherently more likely
to be compatible with multiple ‘auxiliary’ hypotheses/assumptions, which real-life experiments may
be unable to control.
3.5.1. Example 1: A simulation
To offer a practical example of the theoretical argument made above, figure 11 reports a simulation. The
value of K(T; X, Y ), i.e. how much we know about a hypothesis given data, was first calculated when a
single hypothesis h1 is at stake, and all other conditions are fixed (figure 11a). Subsequently, the alphabet
of T (the set of hypotheses in the experiment) was expanded to include a second condition, with two
h1, tbh0, tb
h1, tah0, ta
h1h0
H(Y) = 1.42
H(Y |X, h0, tb) = 1.41
H(Y) = 1.42
H(Y |X, h0, ta) = 1.41
H(Y) = 1.45
H(Y |X, h1, ta) = 1.44
H(Y) = 1.45
H(Y |X, h0, tb) = 1.44
H(Y) = 1.44
H(Y |X, h1, tb) = 0.32
H(T) = 1
H(Th,t|X, Y) = 0.43
K(Th,t; X, Y) = 0.145
H(Y) = 1.44
H(Y|X, h1, tb) = 0.32
H(T) = 2
H(Th,t |X, Y) = 1.7
K(Th,t; X, Y) = 0.06
H(T)K(Th,t; X, Y) = 0.12
knowledge value of empirical tests
conclusive test of single hypothesis(a)
(b) test of single hypothesis, plus auxiliary condition
Figure 11. K analysis of the informativeness of data with regard to a hypothesis h, in absence (a) or presence (b) of a second
condition t that modulates results of the test. Numbers report all parameters calculated from the analysis. The R code to generate
the data and figure is in electronic supplementary material. See text for further details and discussion.
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possible states ta or tb, the former of which produces a null finding regardless of h1. The state of this latter
condition (hypothesis/assumption) is not determined in the experiment. The corresponding value of
K(T; X, Y ) is measurably lower, even if rescaled to account for the greater complexity of the
explanandum (i.e. the number of tested hypotheses, figure 11b).
This is a simple illustration of how the value of negative results depends on the number of
uncontrolled conditions and/or possible hypotheses. If field-specific methods to estimate the number
of auxiliary hypotheses are developed, the field-specific and study-specific informativeness of a null
result could be estimated and compared.
The conclusions reached in this section, combined with the limitations of replication studies discussed
in §3.4, may offer new insights into debates over the problem of publication bias and how to solve it. This
aspect is briefly discussed in the example below.
3.5.2. Example 2: Should we publish all negative results?
Debates on whether publication bias is a bane or boon in disguise recur in the literature of the biological
and social sciences. A vivid example was offered by two recent studies that used virtually identical
methods and arguments but reached opposite conclusions concerning whether ‘publishing everything
is more effective than selective publishing of statistically significant results’ [44,45].
Who is right? Both perspectives may be right or wrong, depending on specific conditions of a field,
i.e. of a research question and a methodology. An explicit but rarely discussed assumption made by most
analyses of publication bias is that the primary studies subjected to bias are of ‘similar quality’. What this
quality specifically consists in is never defined concretely. Nonetheless, it seems plausible to assume that
quality, like any other property of studies, will be unequally distributed within a literature, and the level
of heterogeneity will vary across fields. This field-specific heterogeneity, however, cannot be overlooked,
because it determines the value of H(TjY, X, m) and jT j, i.e. the falsifiability of the main hypothesis being
tested. Therefore, to properly estimate the true prevalence and impact of publication bias and determine
cost-effective solutions, the falsifiability of hypotheses needs to be estimated on a case-by-case (i.e. field-
specific or methodology-specific) basis.
In general, the analysis above suggests that current concerns for publication bias and investments to
counter it are most justified in fields in which methodologies are well codified and hypotheses to be
tested are simple and clearly defined. This is likely to be the condition of most physical sciences, in
which not coincidentally negative results appear to be valued as much or more than positive results
[46,47]. It may also reflect the condition of research in clinical medicine, in which clearly identified
hypotheses (treatments) are tested with relatively well-codified methods (randomized controlled
trials). This would explain why concerns for publication bias have been widespread and most
proactively addressed in clinical medicine [42]). However, the value of negative results is likely to be
lower in other research fields, and therefore the cost–benefit ratio of interventions to counter
publication bias need to be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
Methods proposed in this article might help us determine relevant field-specific and study-specific
conditions. In particular, the statistical relevance of a null result produced by a study with regard to a
specified hypothesis is likely to be inversely related to the expected divergence of the study from a
standard (or an ideal) methodology and explanandum l  d (§3.4). This effect is in turn modulated by
the complexity and flexibility of a field’s methodological choices and magnitude of effect sizes, both
quantifiable in terms of the K function proposed in this study.
3.6. How much knowledge do we lose from questionable research practices?
Problem: In addition to relatively well-defined forms of scientific misconduct, studies and policies about
research integrity typically address a broader category of ‘questionable research practices’ (QRP). This is
a class of rather loosely defined behaviours such as ‘dropping outliers based on a feeling that they were
inaccurate’, or ‘failing to publish results that contradicted one’s previous findings’. Behaviours that, by
definition, may or may not be improper, depending on the context [48].
Since QRP are likely to be more frequent than outright fraud, it has long been argued that their
impact on the reliability of the literature may be very high—indeed, even higher than that of data
fabrication or falsification (e.g. [49]). However, besides obvious difficulties in quantifying the relative
frequency of proper versus improper QRP, there is little epistemological or methodological basis for
grouping together an extremely heterogeneous set of practices and branding them as equally
worrying [50]. Setting aside ethical breaches that do not affect the validity of data or results—which
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will not be considered here—it is obvious that our concerns for QRP ought to be proportional not simply
to the frequency of their use but to the frequency of their use multiplied by the distorting effect on the
literature. How can we quantify the impact of misconduct and QRP?
Answer: The impact on knowledge of a Questionable Research Practice is given by a ‘bias-corrected’ K
value
Kcorr ; Ku  hu
hb
B, (3:26)
in which Ku ¼ K(Y; X, t) is the ‘unbiased’ K, hu ¼ nY H(Y )/(nY H(Y ) þ nX H(X ) 2 log p(t)) and hb ¼ nY
H(Y )/(nY H(Y ) þ nX H(X ) 2 log p(t) 2 nblog p(b)) are the the hardness terms for the study, without and
with bias, respectively, and
B ¼ D(YjX, tkYjX, t, b)
nYH(Y)þ nXH(X) log p(t) (3:27)
is the bias caused by the practice.
Explanation: Equation (3.26) is derived by a similar logic to that of predictive success, discussed
in §2.3.2. If a research practice is deemed epistemologically improper, that is because it must
introduce a bias in the result. This implies that the claim made using the biased practice b is
different from the claim that is declared or intended: K(Y; X, t, b)= K(Y; X, t). Just as in the
case of prediction costs, therefore, we can adjust the K value by subtracting from it the costs
required to derive the claimed result from the observed one, costs that are here quantified by B
(equation (2.26)).
Differently from the case of prediction, however, in the presence of bias the methods employed are of
different size. In particular, the bias introduced in the results has required an additional methodology b.
Following our standard approach, we posit that b is an element of the alphabet of a uniform random
variable B. Similarly to t, 2log p(b) is the description length of a sequence of choices and nb will be
the number of times these choices have to be made. For example, a biased research design (that is, an
ante hoc bias) will have nb ¼ 1, and therefore a cost 2log p(b) corresponding to the description length
of the additional components to be added to t. Conversely, if the bias is a post hoc manipulation of
some data or variables, then b may be as simple as a binary choice between dropping and retaining
data (see example below), and nb may be as high as nY or higher. The term hu/hb quantifies the
relative costs of the biased methodology.
An important property of equation (3.26) is that the condition holds regardless of the direction of the
bias. The term B is always non-negative, independent of how results are shifted. Therefore, a QRP that
nullified an otherwise large effect (in other words, a bias against a positive result) would require a
downwards correction just as one that magnified it.
3.6.1. Example 1: Knowledge cost of data fabrication
The act of fabricating an entire study, its dataset, methods, analysis and results can be considered an
extreme form of ante hoc bias, in which the claimed effect was generated entirely by the methods.
Let b represent the method that fabricated the entire study. By assumption, the effect observed
without that method is zero, yielding
Kcorr ¼  hu
hb
B , 0: (3:28)
Hence, an entirely fabricated study yields no positive knowledge and yields indeed negative knowledge.
This result suggests a solution to an interesting epistemological conundrum raised by the scenario in
which a fabricated study reports a true fact: if independent, genuine studies confirm the made-up
finding, then technically the fabricated study did no damage to knowledge. Shall we therefore
conclude that data fabrication can help scientific progress?
Equation (3.26) may shed new light on this conundrum. We can let K represent the amount of genuine
knowledge attained within a field. The fabricated study’s Kcorr is then K2 (hu/hb)B  0, because B ¼ K
and hu . hb. The extra information costs of fabricating the entire study generate a net loss of
information, even if the underlying claim is correct.
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3.6.2. Example 2: Knowledge cost of arbitrarily dropping data points
Let’s imagine a researcher who collected a sample of n data points and made a claim K(Yn; Xn, t) . 0
without explicitly declaring that during the analysis she had dropped a certain number nb of data
points which made her results look ‘better’—i.e. her K appear larger than it is. How egregious was
this behaviour?
From equation (3.26), we derive the minimum conditions under which a bias is tolerable (Kcorr . 0) as
K(Y; X, t) .
hu
hb
B: (3:29)
The choice to drop or not a data point is binary, and therefore 2log p (b) ¼ 1. In the best-case
scenario, the researcher identified possible outliers based on a conventional threshold of 3s, and was
therefore confronted with the choice of dropping only 0.3% of her data points, i.e. nb ¼ 0.003n. This
leads to hu/hb  1 and the simplified condition, K . B, in which the bias has to be smaller than the
total effect reported. For B  K to occur under these conditions (in other words, to generate the full
reported effect by dropping no more than 0:3% of data points), it has to be the case that either the
reported effect K was extremely small, and therefore unlikely to be substantively significant, or that
the dropped outliers were extremely deviant from the normal range of data. In the latter case, the
outliers ought to have been removed and, if naively retained in the dataset, their presence and
influence would not go unnoticed to the reader. Therefore, arbitrariness in dropping statistical outliers
has a minor impact on knowledge.
In the worst-case scenario, however, the researcher has inspected each of the n data points and
decided whether to drop them or not based on their values. In this case, nb ¼ n, and 2log p(b)	 1
because the bias consists in a highly complex procedure in which each value of the data is assessed
for its impact on the results, and then retained or dropped accordingly. For the purposes of
illustration, we will assume that b is as complex as the dataset, in which case
hu
hb
¼ 1þ  log p(b)
H(Y)þH(X) log p(t)
n
 2 (3:30)
with the latter approximation derived from assuming that n is large. In this case, therefore the QRP
would be tolerable only if K. 2B, i.e. the result obtained without the QRP is twice as large as
that produced with the QRP. However, if the K was very large to begin with, then the researcher
would have little improper reasons to drop data points, unless she was biased against producing a
result (in which case K ¼ B and therefore Kcorr , 0). Therefore, under the most likely conditions in
which it occurs, selecting data points indiscriminately would be an extremely damaging practice,
leading to Kcorr , 0.
The two examples above illustrate how the generic and very ambiguous concept of QRP can be defined
more precisely. A similar logic could be applied to all kinds of QRP, to assess their context-specific
impact, to distinguish the instances that are innocuous or even positive from the ones of concern, and to
rank the latter according to the actual damage they might do to knowledge in different research fields.
This logic may also aid in assessing the egregiousness of investigated cases of scientific misconduct.
3.7. What characterizes a pseudoscience?
Problem: Philosophers have proposed a vast and articulated panorama of criteria to demarcate genuine
scientific activity from metaphysics or pseudoscience (table 2).
However, none of these criteria are accepted as universally valid, and prominent contemporary
philosophers of science tend to endorse a ‘multi-criteria’ approach, in which the sciences share a
‘family resemblance’ to each other but no single universal trait is common to all of them (e.g. [51–53]).
The multi-criterial solution to the demarcation problem is appealing but has limited theoretical and
practical utility. In particular, it shifts the question from identifying a single property common to all the
sciences to identifying many properties common to some. Proposed lists of criteria typically include
normative principles or behavioural standards such as ‘rigorously assessing evidence’, ‘openness to
criticism’, etc. These standards are unobjectionable but are hard to assess rigorously. Furthermore,
since the minimum number of characteristics that a legitimate science should possess is somewhat
arbitrary, virtually any practice may be considered a ‘science’ according to one scheme or another
(e.g. intelligent design [60]).
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Is there a single distinctive characteristic of pseudosciences and, if so, how can we measure it?
Answer: A pseudoscientific field is characterized by Kcorr , 0, because
K ,
hu
hb
B, (3:31)
where the terms K, B, hu, hb are the cumulative equivalent of the terms in equation (3.26).
Explanation: Activities such as palmistry, astrology, homeopathy or psychoanalysis are characterized
by having a defined methodology, which contains its own laws, rules and procedures, let us call it c. This
c is what makes these practices appear scientific, and it is believed by its practitioners to produce a K(Y;
X, c) . 0. However, such activities are deemed epistemically worthless (and have been so, in many cases,
for centuries before the concept of science was formalized), because they typically manifest three
conditions: (1) they (appear to) produce large amounts of explanatory knowledge but typically little
predictive or causal knowledge; (2) any predictive success or causal power that their practitioners
attribute to the explanans is more economically explained by well-understood and unrelated
Table 2. Previously proposed demarcation criteria.
principle science non-/pseudoscience author year [ref ]
positivism reached the positive stage:
builds knowledge on
empirical data
still in theological or meta-
physical stages: phenomena
are explained by recurring
to deities or non-
observables entities
Comte 1830 [2]
methodologism follows rigorous methods for
selecting hypotheses,
acquiring data and drawing
conclusions
fails to follow the scientiﬁc
method
e.g. Pearson 1900 [54],
Poincare´ 1914 [55]
veriﬁcationism builds upon veriﬁed statements relies on non-veriﬁable
statements
Wittgenstein 1922 [56]
falsiﬁcationism builds upon falsiﬁable, non-
falsiﬁed statements
produces explanations devoid
of veriﬁable counterfactuals
Popper 1959 [41]
methodological
falsiﬁcationism
generates theories of increasing
empirical content, which are
accepted when surprising
predictions are conﬁrmed
protects its theories with a
growing belt of auxiliary
hypotheses, giving rise to
‘degenerate’ research
programmes
Lakatos 1970 [57]
norms follows four fundamental
norms, namely: universalism,
communism,
disinterestedness, organized
scepticism
operates on different, if not
the opposite, sets of norms
Merton 1942 [58]
paradigm is post-paradigmatic, meaning it
solves puzzles deﬁned and
delimited by the rules of an
accepted paradigm
is pre-paradigmatic: lacks a
unique and unifying
intellectual framework or is
fragmented into multiple
competing paradigms
Kuhn 1974 [59]
multi-criterial
approaches
bears a sufﬁcient ‘family
resemblance’ to other
activities we call ‘science’
shares too few characteristics
with activities that we
consider scientiﬁc
e.g. Laudan 1983 [51],
Dupre 1993 [52],
Pigliucci 2013 [53]
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phenomena and methodologies; and/or (3) their theories and methodologies are independent from, and
often incompatible with, those of well-established and successful theories and methodologies ([53]).
All three properties are contained and quantified in equation (3.26).
— Condition 1 implies that a field’s observed, as opposed to predicted, K is zero, leading to the condition
Kadj , 0 (§2.3.2) and therefore also to Kcorr , 0 (§3.6).
— Condition 2 entails that, to any extent that a pseudoscientific methodology (appears to) successfully
explain, influence or predict an outcome, the same effect can be obtained with a t that lacks the
specific component c. Conscious and unconscious biases in study design (e.g. failure to account
for the placebo effect) and post hoc biases (e.g. second-guessing one’s interpretation) fall into this
category of explainable effects. We could also interpret K as being the effect produced by standard
methods t, and B as the (identical) effect produced by the pseudoscience, which, however,
has a methodology that is more complex than necessary (the sum 2(log p(t) þ log p(c))), leading
to hu/hb. 1 in equation (3.31).
— Condition 3 can be quantitatively understood as a cost of combining incompatible theories. Let y be a
third theory, which represents the combination of the pseudoscientific theory c with other standard
theories t. When the two theories are simply used opportunistically and not unified in a single,
coherent theory, then log p(y) ¼ log p(t) þ log p(c). When the two theories are entirely compatible
with each other, indeed one is partially or entirely accounted for by the other, then
2logp(y)
2log p(t) 2 log p(c). Conversely, to the extent that the two theories are not directly
compatible, such that additional theory needs to be added and formulated to attain a coherent and
unified account 2log p(y)	2log p(t) 2 log p(c), leading to hu/hb	 1 in equation (3.31). Formal
methods to quantify theoretical discrepancies may be developed in future work.
3.7.1. Example: How pseudoscientific is Astrology?
Many studies have been conducted to test the predictions of Astrology, but their results were typically
rejected by practising astrologers on various methodological grounds. A notable exception is
represented by [61], a study that was designed and conducted with the collaboration and approval of
the National Council for Geocosmic Research, a highly prominent organization of astrologers.
In the part of the experiment that was deemed most informative, practising astrologers were asked to
match an astrological natal chart with one of three personality profiles produced using the California
Personality Inventory. If the natal chart contains no useful information about an individual’s
personality, the success rate is expected to be 33%, giving H(Y ) ¼ 1.58. The astrologers predicted that
their success rate would be at least 50%, suggesting H(YjX, c) ¼ 1.58/2 ¼ 0.79. The astrologer’s
explanans includes the production of a natal chart, which requires the input of the subject’s birth time
(hh:mm), date (dd/mm/yyyy) and location (latitude and longitude, four digits each) for a total
information of approximately 50 bits. The theory c includes the algorithm to compute the star and
planet’s position, and the relation between these and the personality of the individual. The size of c
could be estimated, but we will leave this task to future analyses. This omission may have a
significant or a negligible impact on the calculations, in proportion to how large the nY is, i.e. in
proportion to how unchanging the methods of astrology are. The alternative, scientific hypothesis
according to which there is no effect to be observed, has hu ¼ 1.
Results of the experiment showed that the astrologers did not guess an individual’s personality above
chance [61]. Therefore, K ¼ 0 and equation (3.31) is satisfied. The K value of astrology from this study is
estimated to be
K(Y; X, c) ¼  hu
hb
B ¼ 
1:58þ 50 log (c) nc
nY
1:58
1:58 0:79
1:58
, 16:32 (3:32)
in which the inequality is due to the unspecified size of c and nY. This analysis is still likely to over-
estimate the K of Astrology, because the experiment offered a conservative choice between only three
alternatives, whereas astrology’s claimed explanandum is likely to be much larger, as it includes
multiple personality dimensions (§3.3.3).
3.8. What makes a science ‘soft’?
Problem: There is extensive evidence that many aspects of scientific practices and literatures vary
gradually and almost linearly if disciplines are arranged according to the complexity of their subject
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matters (i.e. broadly speaking, mathematics, physical, biological, social sciences and humanities) [46,62–
64]. This order reflects what people intuitively would consider an order of increasing scientific ‘softness’,
yet this concept has no precise definition and the adjective ‘soft science’ is mostly considered denigrative.
This may be why the notion of a hierarchy of the sciences is nowadays disregarded in favour of a partial
or complete epistemological pluralism (e.g. [52]). How can we define and measure scientific softness?
Answer: Given two fields studying systems YA, XA, tA and YB, XB, tB, field A is harder than B if
kA
kB
.
hB
hA
(3:33)
in which kA, kB and hA, hB are representatively valid estimates of the fields’ bias-adjusted cumulative
effects and hardness component, given by properties of their systems as well as the field’s average
level of accuracy, reproducibility and bias.
Explanation: equation (3.33) is a re-arrangement of the condition K(YA; XA, tA) . K(YB; XB, tB), i.e. the
condition that field A is more negentropically efficient than field B. As argued below, this condition
reflects the intuitive concept of scientific hardness.
The various criteria proposed to distinguish stereotypically ‘hard’ sciences like physics from
stereotypically ‘soft’ ones like sociology cluster along two relevant dimensions:
— Complexity: moving across research fields from the physical to the social sciences, subject matters go
from being simple and general to being complex and particular. This increase in complexity
corresponds, intuitively, to an increase in the systems’ number of relevant variables and the
intricacy of their interactions [65].
— Consensus: moving across research fields from the physical to the social sciences, there is a decline in
the ability of scientists to reach agreement on the relevance of findings, on the correct methodologies
to use, even on the relevant research questions to ask, and therefore ultimately on the validity of any
particular theory [66].
(see table 3, and [64] for further references).
Both concepts have a straightforward mathematical interpretation, which points to the same
underlying characteristic: having a relatively complex explanans and therefore a low K. A system with
many interacting variables is a system for which H(X ) and/or H(YjX, t) are large. Consequently,
progress is slow (§3.3). A system in which consensus is low is one in which the cumulative
Table 3. Properties previously proposed to vary across the sciences.
principle property or properties author year [ref ]
hierarchy of the
sciences
simplicity, generality, quantiﬁability, recency, human relevance Comte 1830 [2]
consilience ability to subsume disparate phenomena under general principles Whewell 1840 [67]
lawfulness nomoteticity, i.e. interest in ﬁnding general laws, as opposed to
idioteticity, i.e. interest in characterizing individuality
Windelband 1894 [68]
data hardness data that resist the solvent inﬂuence of critical reﬂection Russell 1914 [69]
empiricism ability to calculate in advance the results of an experiment Conant 1951 [70]
rigour rigour in relating data to theory Storer 1967 [71]
maturity ability to produce and test mechanistic hypotheses, as opposed to
mere fact collection
Bunge 1967 [72]
cumulativity cumulation of knowledge in tightly integrated structures Price 1970 [73]
codiﬁcation consolidation of empirical knowledge into succinct and
interdependent theoretical formulations
Zuckerman & Merton
1973 [66]
consensus level of consensus on the signiﬁcance of new knowledge and the
continuing relevance of old
Zuckerman & Merton
1973 [66]
core cumulativity rapidly growing core of unquestioned general knowledge Cole 1983 [74]
invariance contextual invariance of phenomena Humphreys 1990 [65]
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methodology tþ dt expands rapidly as the literature grows. Moreover, higher complexity and
particularity of subject matter entails that a given knowledge is applicable to a limited number of
phenomena, entailing smaller nY. Therefore, all the typical traits associated with a ‘soft’ science lead to
predict a lower value of K.
3.8.1. Example: mapping a hierarchy of the sciences
The idea that the sciences can be ordered by a hierarchy, which reflects the growing complexity of subject
matter and, in reverse order, the speed of scientific progress, can be traced back at least to the ideas of
Auguste Comte (1798–1857). The K values estimated in previous sections for various disciplines
approximately reflect the order expected based on equation (3.33), particularly if the rescaled K values
are compared instead, i.e.
H(YA)kAhA . H(YB)kBhB: (3:34)
Mathematics is a partial exception, in that its K value is likely to be in most cases higher than that of
any empirical field, but its rescaled K is not (at least, not if we quantify the explanandum as a binary
question). Intriguingly, mathematics were considered an exception also in August Comte’s scheme,
due to their non-empirical nature. Therefore, the K account of the hierarchy of the sciences mirrors
Comte’s original hierarchy rather accurately.
However, the hierarchy depicted by results in this essay is merely suggestive, because the examples
we used are preliminary. In addition to making frequent simplifying assumptions, the estimates of
K derived in this essay were usually based on individual cases (not on cumulative evidence coming
from a body of literature) and have overlooked characteristics of a field that may be relevant to
determine the hierarchy (for example, the average reproducibility of a literature). Moreover, there may
be yet unresolved problems of scaling that impede a direct comparison between widely different
systems. Therefore, at present, equation (3.34) can at best be used to rank fields that are relatively
similar to each other, whereas methods to compare widely different systems may require further
methodological developments.
If produced, a K-based hierarchy of the sciences would considerably extend Comte’s vision in at least
two respects. Firstly, it would rank not quite ‘the sciences’ but rather scientific ‘fields’, i.e. literatures and/
or research communities identified by a common explanandum and/or explanans. Although the average
K values of research fields in the physical, biological and social sciences are predicted to reflect Comte’s
hierarchy, the variance within each science is likely to be great. It is entirely possible that some fields
within the physical sciences may turn out to have lower K values (and therefore to be ‘softer’) than
some fields in the biological and social sciences and vice versa. Secondly, as illustrated in §3.7, a
K-based hierarchy would encompass not just sciences but also pseudosciences. Whereas the former
extend in the positive range of K values, the latter extend in the negative direction. The more negative
the value, the more pseudoscientific the field.
4. Discussion
This article proposed that K, a quantity derived from a simple function, is a general quantifier of
knowledge that could find useful applications in meta-research and beyond. It was shown that, in
addition to providing a universal measure of effect size, K theory yields concise and memorable
equations that answer meta-scientific questions and may help understand and forecast phenomena of
great interest, including reproducibility, bias and misconduct, and scientific progress (table 1). This
section will first discuss how K theory may solve limitations of current meta-science (§4.1 and 4.2),
then address the most likely sources of criticisms (§4.3), and finally it will suggest how the theory can
be tested (§4.4).
4.1. Limitations of current meta-science
The growing success and importance of meta-research have made the need for a meta-theory ever more
salient and pressing. Growing resources are invested, for example, in ensuring reproducibility [1], but
there is little agreement on how reproducibility ought to be predicted, measured and understood in
different fields [31,75]. Graduate students are trained in courses to avoid scientific misconduct and
questionable research practices, and yet the definition, prevalence and impact of questionable
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behaviours across science are far from well established [50]. Increasing efforts are devoted to measuring
and countering well-documented problems such as publication bias, even though inconclusive empirical
evidence [42] and past failures of similar initiatives (e.g. the withering and closure of most journals of
negative results [76]) suggest that the causes of these problems are incompletely understood.
At present, meta-scientific questions are addressed using theoretical models derived from very
specific fields. As a consequence, their results are not easily extrapolated to other contexts. The most
prominent example is offered by the famous claim that most published research findings are false
[77]. This landmark analysis has deservedly inspired meta-studies in all disciplines. However, its
predictions are based on an extrapolation of statistical techniques used in genetic epidemiology that
have several limiting assumptions. These assumptions include that all findings are generated by stable
underlying phenomena, independently of one another, with no information on their individual
plausibility or posterior odds, and with low prior odds of any one effect being true. These
assumptions are unlikely to be fully met even within genetic studies [78], and the extent to which
they apply to any given research field remains to be determined.
Similar limiting assumptions are increasingly noted in the application of meta-research
methodologies. Reproducibility and bias, for example, are measured using meta-analytical techniques
that treat sources of variation between studies as either fixed or random [13,79]. This assumption may
be valid when aggregating results of randomized control trials [80], but may be inadequate when
comparing results of fields that use varying and evolving methods (e.g. ecology [81]) and that study
complex systems that are subject to non-random variation (expressed, for example, in reaction norms [82]).
Statistical models can be used to explore the effects of different theoretical assumptions (e.g. [83–86])
as well as other conditions that are believed to conduce to bias and irreproducibility (e.g. [87,88]).
However, the plural of ‘model’ is not ‘theory’. A genuine ‘theory of meta-science’ ought to offer a
general framework that, from maximally simple and universal assumptions, explains how and why
scientific knowledge is shaped by local conditions.
4.2. K theory as a meta-theory of science
Why does K theory offer the needed framework? First and foremost, this theory provides a quantitative
language to discuss meta-scientific concepts in terms that are general and abstract and yet specific
enough to avoid confusing over-simplifications. For example, the concept of bias is often
operationalized in meta-research as an excess of statistically significant findings [77] or as an
exaggeration of findings due to QRP [89]. Depending on the meta-research question, however, these
definitions may be too narrow, because they exclude biases against positive findings and only apply
to studies that use null-hypothesis significance testing, or they may be too generic, because they
aggregate research practices that differ in relevant ways from each other. Similar difficulties in how
reproducibility, negative results and other concepts are used have emerged in the literature as
discussed in the Results section. As illustrated by the examples offered throughout this essay, K
theory avoids these limitations by proposing concepts and measures that are extremely abstract and
yet adaptable to reflect field-specific contexts.
Beyond the conceptual level, K theory contextualizes meta-research results at an appropriate level of
generalization. Current meta-research models and empirical studies face a conundrum: they usually aim
to draw general conclusions about phenomena that may occur anywhere in science, but these
phenomena find contextual expression in fields that vary widely in characteristics of subject matter,
theory, methodology and other aspects. As a result, meta-research studies are forced to choose
between under-generalizing their conclusions by restricting them to a specific field or literature and
over-generalizing them to an entire field or discipline, or even to the whole of science. One of the
unfortunate consequences of this over-generalization of results has been the diffusion of a narrative
that ‘science is in crisis’, narrative that has no empirical or pragmatic justification [75]. Excessive
under- and over-generalizations may be avoided by systematizing meta-research results with K theory,
which offers a mid-level understanding of meta-scientific phenomena that is independent of subject
matter and yet measurable in context.
An example of the mid-level generalizations permitted by K theory is the hierarchy of sciences and
pseudosciences proposed in §3.8. A classification based on this approach, for example, could lead us
to abandon traditional disciplinary categories (e.g. ‘physics’ or ‘social psychology’) in favour of
epistemologically relevant categories such as ‘high-h’ fields, or ‘low-l’ systems.
Other classifications and theories about science may be derived from K theory. An alternative to the
rather ill-defined ‘hard–soft’ dimension, for example, could be a continuum between two strategies. At
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one end of the spectrum, is what we might call a ‘t-strategy’, which invests more resources in identifying
and encoding regularities and laws that allow general explanations and long-term predictions, at the cost
of contingent details. At the other end, is an ‘X-strategy’, which invests greater resources in acquiring
large amounts of contingent, descriptive information that enables accurate but proximate explanations
and predictions. Depending on characteristics of the explananda and the amount of resources
available for the storage and processing of information, each scientific field expresses an optimal
balance between t-strategy and X-strategy.
4.3. Foreseeable criticisms and limitations
At least five criticisms of this essay may be expected. The first is a philosophical concern with the notion
of knowledge, which in this article is defined as information compression by pattern encoding. Critics
might argue that this definition does not correspond to the epistemological notion of knowledge as
‘true, justified belief’ [90]. Even Fred Dretske, whose work extensively explored the connection
between knowledge and information [10], maintained that ‘false information’ was not genuine
information and that knowledge required the latter [91]. The notion of knowledge proposed in this
text, however, is only apparently unorthodox. In the K formalism, a true justified belief corresponds to
a system for which K . 0. It can be shown that a ‘false, unjustified’ belief is one in which K  0.
Therefore, far from contradicting information-theoretic epistemologies, K theory may give quantitative
answers to open epistemological questions such as ‘how much information is enough’? [91].
The second criticism may be that the ideas proposed in this essay are too simple and general not to
have been proposed before. The claim made by this essay, however, is not that every concept in it is new.
Rather to the contrary, the claim is that K theory unifies and synthesizes innumerable previous
approaches to combining cognition, philosophy and information theory, and it does so in a
formulation that, to the best of the author’s knowledge, is entirely new and original. Earlier ideas
that have inspired the K function are found, for example, in Brillouin’s book Science and information
theory, which discussed the information value of experiments and calculated the information content
of a physical law [5]. Brillouin’s analysis, however, did not include factors that are key to the K
function, including the standardization on logarithm space, the decline rate of knowledge, the number
nY of potential applications of knowledge and the inclusion of the information costs of the theory t.
The description length of theories (or, at least, of statistical models) is a key component of the
minimum description length principle, which was first proposed by Rissanen [7] and is finding
growing applications in problems of statistical inference and computation (e.g. [6,8]). The methods
developed by MDL proponents and by algorithmic information theory are entirely compatible with
the K function (and could be used to quantify t) but differ from it in important theoretical and
mathematical aspects (§2.2.2). Within philosophy, Paul Thagard’s Computational philosophy of science
[11] offers numerous insights into the nature of scientific theories and methodologies. Thagard’s ideas
may be relevant to K theory because, among other things, they illustrate what the t of a scientific
theory might actually contain. However, Thagard’s theory differs from K theory in substantive
conceptual and mathematical aspects, and it does not offer a general quantifier of knowledge nor
does it produce a meta-scientific methodology. Finally, K theory was developed independently from
other recent attempts to give informational accounts of cognitive phenomena, for example, the free-
energy principle (e.g. [92]) and the integrated information theory of consciousness (e.g. [93]). Whereas
these theories bear little resemblance to that proposed in this essay, they obviously share a common
objective with it, and possible connections may be explored in future research.
The third criticism might be methodological, because entropy is a difficult quantity to measure.
Estimates of entropy based on empirical frequencies can be biased when sample sizes are small, and
they can be computationally demanding when data is large and multi-dimensional. Neither of these
limitations, however, is critical. With regard to the former problem, as demonstrated in §2.3.6,
powerful computational methods to estimate entropy with limited sample size are already available
[18]. With regard to the latter problem, we may note that the ‘multi-dimensional’ Kmd used in §3.3 is
the most complex measure proposed and yet it is not computationally demanding, because it is
derived from computing unidimensional entropies. The ‘cumulative’ Kcum may also be
computationally demanding, as it requires estimating the entropy of mixed distributions. However,
analytical approaches to estimate the entropy of mixed distributions and other complex data
structures are already available and are likely to be developed further (e.g. [94,95]).
The fourth criticism may regard the empirical validity of the measures proposed. As it was
emphasized throughout the text, all the practical examples offered were merely illustrative and
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preliminary, because they generally relied on incomplete data and simplifying assumptions. In
particular, it appears to be difficult to quantify exactly the information content of t, especially for
what concerns the description of a methodology. This limitation, however, is often avoidable. In most
contexts of interests, it will suffice to estimate t with some approximation and/or in relative terms. It
may be a common objective within studies using K theory, for example, to estimate the divergence
between two methodologies. Even if complete information about a methodology in unavailable (if
anything, because it is likely to include ‘tacit’ components that are by definition hidden) relative
differences documented in the methods’ description are simple to identify and therefore to quantify
by K methods. These relative quantifications could become remarkably accurate and extend across
research fields, if they were based on a reliable taxonomy of methods that provided a fixed ‘alphabet’
T of methodological choices characterizing scientific studies. Taxonomies for research methods are
already being developed in many fields to improve reporting standards (e.g. [96]) and could be
extended by meta-scientists for meta-research purposes.
The fifth criticism that may be moved to K theory is that it is naively reductionist, because it appears
to overlook the preponderant role that historical, economic, sociological and psychological conditions
play in shaping scientific practices. Quite to the contrary, K theory is not proposed as an alternative to
historical and social analyses of science, but as a useful complement to them, which is necessary to
fully understand the history and sociology of a research field. A parallel may be drawn with
evolutionary biology: to explain why a particular species evolved a certain phenotype or to forecast
its risk of extinction, we need to combine contingent facts about the species’ natural history with
general theories about fitness dynamics; similarly, to better understand and forecast the trajectory
taken by a field we need to combine contingent and historical information with general principles
about knowledge dynamics.
4.4. Testable predictions and conclusion
We can summarize the overall prediction of K theory in a generalized rule: An activity will exhibit
the epistemological, historical, sociological and psychological properties associated with a science if and to the
extent that:
K .
h
hb
B, (4:1)
in which K is the knowledge, corrected for biases, and hb and B are the costs and impacts of biases
internal or external to the system. If biases are absent or not easily separable from the system, and
indicating with K the overall knowledge yield of the activity, the rule simplifies to
K . 0: (4:2)
This overall prediction finds specific expression in the relations reported in table 1, each of which
leads to predict observable phenomena in the history and sociology of science. These predictions include:
— Scientific theories and fields fail or thrive in proportion to the their rate of consilience, measured at all
levels—from the micro (Kcum) to the macro (Kmd, and see inequality (3.11)). For example, we predict
that discredited theories, such as that of phlogiston or phrenology, were characterized by a K that was
steadily declining and were abandoned when K  0. Conversely, fields and theories that grow in size
and importance are predicted to exhibit a positive growth rate of K. When the rate of growth of K
slows down and/or when it reaches a plateau, K is ‘re-set’ to zero by the splitting in sub-fields
and/or the expansion to new explananda or explanantia.
— The expected reproducibility of published results is less than 100% for most if not all fields, and is
inversely related to the average informational divergence, of explanandum and/or explanans,
between the original study and its replications. In some instances, the divergence of methods
might reflect the differential presence of bias. However, the prediction is independent of the
presence of bias.
— The value of null and contradictory findings is smaller or equal to that of ‘positive’ findings, and is
directly related to the level of a field’s theoretical and methodological codification (jT j) and
explanatory power (k). This value may be reflected, for example, in the rate of citations to null
results, their rate of publication and the space such results are given in articles with multiple results.
— In functional sciences, the prevalence of questionable, problematic and openly egregious research
practices is inversely related to their knowledge cost. Therefore, their prevalence will vary
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depending on details of the practice (e.g. how it is defined) as well as the level of codification and
explanatory power of the field.
— The relative prestige and influence of a field is directly related to its K (scaled and/or not scaled). All
else being equal, activities that can account for greater explananda with smaller explanantia are
granted a higher status, reflected in symbolic and/or material investments (e.g. societal recognition
and/or public research funds).
— The relative popularity and influence of a pseudoscience is inversely related to its K. An activity that
(pretends) to yield knowledge will acquire relatively more prestige to the extent that it promises to
explain a wider range of phenomena using methods that appear to be highly codified and very
complex.
The testability of these predictions is limited by the need to keep ‘all else equal’. As discussed above,
there is no denying that contingent and idiosyncratic factors shape the observable phenomena of
science to a significant, possibly preponderant extent. Indeed, if empirical studies using K theory
cumulate, we may eventually be able to apply K theory to itself, and it may turn out that the
empirical K value of K theory is relatively small and that, to any extent that external confounding
effects are not accounted for, the jT j of K theory is large, leading to low falsifiability.
The testability of K theory, however, extends beyond the cases examined in this essay. On the one
hand, within meta-science, more contextualized analyses about a field or a theory will lead to more
specific and localized predictions. These localized predictions will be more accurately testable, because
most irrelevant factors will be controlled for more easily. On the other hand, and most importantly,
the theory can in principle apply to phenomena outside the contexts of science.
The focus of this article has been quantitative scientific research, mainly because this is the subject
matter that inspired the theory and that represents the manifestation of knowledge that is easier to
conceptualize and quantify. However, the theory and methods proposed in this essay could be
adapted to measure qualitative research and other forms of knowledge. Indeed, with further
development, the K function could be used to quantify any expression of cognition and learning,
including humour, art, biological evolution or artificial intelligence (see appendix A), generating new
explanations and predictions that may be explored in future analyses.
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Appendix A
A.1. Postulates underlying K theory
A.1.1. Postulate 1: information is finite
The first postulate appears to reflect a simple but easily overlooked fact of nature. The universe—at least,
the portion of it that we can see and have causal connection to—contains finite amounts of matter and
energy, and therefore cannot contain infinite amounts of information. If each quantum state represents a
bit, and each transition between (orthogonal) states represents an operation, then the universe has
performed circa 10120 operations on 1090 bits since the Big Bang [97].
Advances in quantum information theory suggest that our universe may have access to unlimited
amounts of information, or at least of information processing capabilities [98] (but see [99] for a
critique). However, even if this were the case, there would still be little doubt that information is finite
as it pertains to knowledge attainable by organisms. Sensory organs, brains, genomes and all other
pattern-encoding structures that underlie learning are finite. The sense of vision is constructed from a
limited number of cone and rod cells; the sense of hearing uses information from a limited number of
hair cells, each of which responds to a narrow band of acoustic frequencies; brains contain a limited
number of connections; genomes a countable number of bases, etc. The finitude of all biological
structures is one of the considerations that has led cognitive scientists and biologists to assume
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information is finite when attempting, for example, to model the evolution of animal cognitive abilities
[100]. Even mathematicians have been looking with suspicion to the notion of infinity for a long time
[101]. For example, it has been repeatedly and independently shown that, if rational numbers were
actually infinite, then infinite information could be stored in them and this would lead to
insurmountable contradictions [102].
Independent of physical, biological and mathematical considerations, the postulate that information
is finite is justifiable on instrumentalist grounds, because it is the most realistic assumption to make when
analysing scientific knowledge. Quantitative empirical knowledge is based on measurements, which are
technically defined as partitionings of attributes in sets of mutually exclusive categories [103]. In
principle, this partitioning could recur an infinite number of times, but in practice it never does.
Measurement scales used by researchers to quantify empirical phenomena might be idealized as
extending to infinity, but in practice they always consist in a range of plausible values that is
delimited at one or both ends. Values beyond these ends can be imagined as constituting a single set
of extreme values that may occur with very small but finite probability.
Therefore, following either theoretical or instrumentalist arguments, we are compelled to postulate
that information, i.e. the source of knowledge, is a finite quantity. Its fundamental unit of
measurement is discrete and is called the bit, i.e. the ‘difference that makes a difference’, according to
Gregory Bateson’s famous definition [104]. For this difference to make any difference, it must be
perceivable. Hence, information presupposes the capacity to dichotomize signals into ‘same’ and ‘not
same’. This dichotomization can occur recursively and we can picture the process by which
information is generated as a progressive subdivision (quantization) of a unidimensional attribute.
This quantization operates ‘from the inside out’, so to speak, and by necessity always entails two
‘open ends’ of finite probability.
A.1.2. Postulate 2: knowledge is information compression
The second postulate claims that the essence of any manifestation of what we call ‘knowledge’ consists in
the encoding of a pattern, which reduces the amount of information required to navigate the world
successfully. By ‘pattern’ we intend here simply a dependency between attributes—in other words, a
relationship that makes one event more or less likely, from the point of view of an organism,
depending on another event. By encoding patterns, an organism reduces the uncertainty it confronts
about its environment—in other words, it adapts. Therefore, postulate 2, just like postulate 1, is likely
to reflect an elementary fact of nature; a fact that arguably underlies not just human knowledge but
all manifestations of life.
The idea that knowledge, or at least scientific knowledge, is information compression is far from new.
For example, in the late 1800s, physicist and philosopher Ernst Mach argued that the value of physical
laws lay in the ‘economy of thought’ that they permitted [3]. Other prominent scientists and
philosophers of the time, such as mathematician Henri Poincare´, expressed similar ideas [55].
Following the development of information theory, scientific knowledge and other cognitive activities
have been examined in quantitative terms (e.g. [5,105]). Nonetheless, the equivalence between
scientific knowledge and information compression has been presented as a principle of secondary
importance by later philosophers (including for example Popper [41]), and today does not appear to
occupy the foundational role that it arguably deserves [106].
The reluctance to equate science with information compression might be partially explained by
two common misconceptions. The first one is an apparent conflation of lossless compression,
which allows data to be reconstructed exactly, with lossy compression, in which instead
information from the original source is partially lost. Some proponents of the compression
hypothesis adopt exclusively a lossless compression model, and therefore debate whether
empirical data are truly compressible in this sense (e.g. [107]). However, science is clearly a lossy
form of compression: the laws and relations that scientists discover typically include error terms
and tolerate large portions of unexplained variance.
The second, and most important, source of scepticism seems to lie in an insufficient appreciation for
the fundamental role that information compression plays not only in science, but also knowledge and all
other manifestations of biological adaptation. Even scientists who equate information compression with
learning appear to under-estimate the fundamental role that pattern-encoding and information
compression play in all manifestations of life. In their seminal introductory text to Kolmogorov
complexity [6], for example, Li and Vita´nyi unhesitatingly claim that ‘science may be regarded as the
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art of data compression’ [6, p. 713], that ‘learning, in general, appears to involve compression of
observed data or the results of experiments’, and that ‘in everyday life, we continuously compress
information that is presented to us by the environment’, but then appear cautious and conservative in
extending this principle to non-human species, by merely suggesting that ‘perhaps animals do this as
well’, and citing results of studies on tactile information transmission in ants [6, p. 711]. It seems
that even the most prominent experts and proponents of information compression methodologies
can be disinclined to apply their favoured principle beyond the realm of human cognition and
animal behaviour.
This essay takes instead the view that information compression by pattern encoding is the
quintessence of biological adaptation, in all of its manifestations. Changes in a population’s genetic
frequencies in response to environmental pressures can be seen as a form of adaptive learning, in
which natural selection reinforces a certain phenotypic response to a certain environment and
weakens other responses, thereby allowing a population’s genetic codes to ‘remember’ fruitful
responses and ‘forget’ erroneous (i.e. non-adaptive) ones. For these reinforcement processes to occur
at all, environmental conditions must be heterogeneous and yet partially predictable. Natural
selection, in other words, allows regularities in the environment to be genetically encoded. This
process gives rise to biodiversity that may mirror environmental heterogeneity at multiple levels
(populations, varieties, species, etc.). Such environmental heterogeneity is not exclusively spatial
(geographical). Temporal heterogeneity in environmental conditions gives rise to various forms of
phenotypic plasticity, in which identical genomes express different phenotypes depending on cues
and signals received from the environment [108]. Whether genetic or phenotypic, adaptation will be
measurable as a correlation between possible environmental conditions and alternative genotypes or
phenotypes. This correlation is in itself a measurable pattern.
As environments are increasingly shaped by biological processes, they become more complex and
heterogeneous, and they therefore select for ever more efficient adaptive capabilities—ever more rapid
and accurate ways to detect and process environmental cues and signals. Immune systems, for
example, allow large multicellular plants and animals to protect themselves from infective agents and
other biological threats whose rate of change far out-competes their own speed of genetic adaptation;
endocrine systems allow the various parts of an organism to communicate or coordinate their internal
activities in order to respond more rapidly to changes in external conditions. Similar selective
pressures have favoured organisms with nervous systems of increasing size and complexity. Animal
behaviour and cognition, in other words, are simply higher-order manifestations of phenotypic
plasticity, which allow an organism to respond to environmental challenges on shorter temporal scales.
Behavioural responses may be hard-wired in a genome or acquired during an organism’s lifetime, but
in either case they entail ‘learning’ in the more conventional sense of encoding, processing and storing
memories of patterns and regularities abstracted from environmental cues and signals.
Human cognition, therefore, may be best understood as just another manifestation of biological
adaptation by pattern encoding. At the core of human cognition, as with all other forms of biological
adaptation, lies the ability to anticipate events and thus minimize error. When we say that we ‘know’
something, we are claiming that we have fewer uncertainties about it because, given an input, we can
predict above chance what will come next. We ‘know a city’, for example, in proportion to how well
we are able to find our way around it, by going purposely from one street to the next and/or
navigating it by means of a simplified representation of it (i.e. a mental map). This ability embodies
the kind of information we may communicate to a stranger when asked for directions: if we ‘know
the place’, we can provide them with a series of ‘if-then’ statements about what direction to take once
identifiable points are reached. In another example, we ‘know a song’ in proportion to how accurately
we can reproduce its specific sequence of words and intonations with no error or hesitation, or in
proportion to how readily we can recognize it when we hear a few notes from it. Similarly, we ‘know
a person’ in proportion to how many patterns about them we have encoded: at first, we might only
be able to recognize their facial features; after making superficial acquaintance with them, we will be
able to connect these features to their name; when we know them better, we can tell how they will
respond to simple questions such as ‘where are you from?’; eventually we might ‘know them well’
enough to predict their behaviour rather accurately and foretell, for example, the conditions that will
make them feel happy, interested, angry, etc.
The examples above aim to illustrate how the concept of ‘prediction’ underlies all forms of
knowledge, not just scientific knowledge, and applies to both time (e.g. knowing a song) and space
(e.g. knowing a city). Memory and recognition, too, can be qualified as forms of prediction and
therefore as manifestations of information compression, whereby sequences of sensory impressions are
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encoded and recalled (i.e. memorized) or matched to new experiences (i.e. recognized) in response to
endogenous or exogenous signals. Language is also a pattern-encoding, information compression tool.
A typical sentence, which constitutes the fundamental structure of human language and thought,
expresses the connection between one entity, the subject, and another entity or property, via a relation
condition encoded in a verb. It is not a coincidence that the most elementary verb of all—one that is
fundamental to all human languages—is the verb ‘to be’. This verb conveys a direct relation between
two entities, and thus represents the simplest pattern that can be encoded: ‘same’ versus ‘not same’,
as discussed in relation to Postulate 1. Even a seemingly abstract process like logical deduction and
inference can be understood as resulting from pattern encoding. According to some analyses,
computing itself and all other manifestations of artificial and biological intelligence may result from a
simple process of pattern matching [109].
Scientific knowledge, therefore, is most naturally characterized as just one manifestation of human
cognition among many and, therefore, as nothing more than a pattern-encoding activity that reduces
uncertainty about one phenomenon by relating it to information about other phenomena. The
knowledge produced by all fields of scientific research is structured in this way:
— Mathematical theorems uncover logical connections between two seemingly unrelated theoretical
constructs, proving that the two are one and the same.
— Research in the physical sciences typically aims at uncovering mathematical laws, which are rather
explicitly encoding patterns (i.e. relationships between quantities). Even when purely descriptive,
however, physical research actually consists in the encoding of pattern and relations between
phenomena—for example, measuring the atomic weight of a known substance might appear to be
a purely descriptive activity, but the substance itself is identified by its reactive properties.
Therefore, such research is about drawing connections between properties.
— Most biological and biomedical research consists in identifying correlations or causes and/or in
describing properties of natural phenomena, all of which are pattern-encoding activities. Research
in taxonomy and systematics might appear to be an exception, but it is not: organizing the traits of
a multitude of species into a succinct taxonomical tree is the most elementary form of data
compression.
— Quantitative social and behavioural sciences operate in a similar manner to the biological sciences.
Even qualitative, ethnographic, purely descriptive social and historical research consists in data
compression, because it presupposes that there are general facts about human experiences,
individuals, or groups that can be communicated, entailing that they can be described, connected
to each other and/or summarized in a finite amount of text.
— The humanities aim to improve our understanding of complex and often unique human experiences,
and might therefore appear to have fundamentally different objectives from the natural and social
sciences. To any extent that they offer knowledge and understanding, however, these come in the
form of information compression. Research in History, for example, is guided by the reconstruction
and succinct description of events, which is based on logic, inference and drawing connections to
other events, and therefore it follows the principles of economy of thought and compression. The
study of literary works, to make another example, produces knowledge by drawing connections
and similarities between texts, identifying general schemata and/or uncovering new meaning in
texts by recurring to similes and metaphors [110]. Similarities, connections, schemata, similes and
metaphors arguably constitute the basis of human cognition [110] and are all manifestations of
information compression by pattern encoding.
Other non-academic manifestations of human cognition, creativity and communication can be
understood as stemming from a process of information compression, too. The sensual and intellectual
pleasure that humans gain from music and art, for example, seems to derive from an optimal balance
between perception of structure (pattern that generates predictions and expectations) and perception
of novelty (which stimulates interest by presenting new and knowable information) [111]. The sense of
humour similarly seems to arise from the sudden and unexpected overturning of the predicted
pattern, which occurs when an initially plausible explanation of a condition is suddenly replaced by
an alternative, unusual and yet equally valid one [112]. The intellectual and artistic value of a work of
art lies in its ability to reveal previously unnoticed connections between events or phenomena in the
world (thereby revealing a pattern) and/or in its capacity to synthesize and communicate effectively
what are otherwise highly individual, complex and ineffable human experiences—thereby lossy-
compressing and transmitting the experience.
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Appendix B
B.1. Relation with continuous distribution
Indicating with f (x) a probability density function and with h(X) ¼ Ð f(x) log f(x) d(x) the corresponding
differential entropy, we have
H(XD)  h(X)þ log 1
D
¼ h(X)þ n (B 1)
in which D ¼ 22n is the size of the length of the bin in which f (x) is quantized, and n corresponds to the
number of bits required to describe the function to n–bit accuracy. Evidently, we can always rescale X in
order to have D ¼ 1.
Equation (B 1) applies to any probability density function. Here we will consider in particular the case
of the normal distribution, the differential entropy of which is simply h(x) ¼ log ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ2pep sy. Therefore, if y is
a continuous RV, quantized to n bits, for a given x and t we have
K(y; x, t) ¼ log (
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2pe
p
sy)þ n log (
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2pe
p
syjx,t) n
log (
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2pe
p
sy)þ nþ xþ t
¼ log
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2pe
p þ logsy  log
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2pe
p  logsyjx,t
log
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2pe
p þ logs2y þ nþ xþ t
¼ logsy  logsyjx,t
logsy þ xþ tþ log
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2pe
p þ n!
logs0y  logs0yjx,t
logs0y þ xþ tþ log
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2pe
p ¼
logs0y  logs0yjx,t
logs0y þ xþ tþ C
, (B 2)
in which C ¼ log ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ2pep and s0 corresponds to s rescaled to a common lowest significant digit (e.g. from
s ¼ 0.123 to s0 ¼ 123).
Appendix C
Proof.
Kadj ; h
H(Y)P p(y, xjt) log 1
p(yjx, t^)
H(Y)
0
BB@
1
CCA
¼ h
H(Y)P p(y, xjt) log 1
p(yjx, t)
X
p(y, xjt) log p(yjx, t)
p(yjx, t^)
H(Y)
0
BB@
1
CCA
¼ K(Y; X, t)D(YjX, tkYjX, t^) h
H(Y)
; Kobs D(YjX, tkYjX, t^) h
H(Y)
(C 1)
A
Appendix D
Firstly note that, independently of the size of the vectors l and d in equation (2.29), their inner product
yields a number. Therefore, for the purposes of our discussion we can assume l and d to be single
numbers. Equation (2.29) claims that there exists a l [ R such that
l ¼ 1
d
logA
K(Y; X, t)
K(Y0; X0, t0)
(D 1)
in which d. 0 expresses the divergence between systems, and A is an arbitrary basis. This statement is
self-evidently true, as long as K(Y0; X0, t0)= 0 and K(Y; X, t)= 0 or, equivalently, if we allow l to be
approximately infinite in the case that K goes to zero in one step d ¼ 1. However, two rather useful
conclusions can be derived about this equation:
(i) Under most conditions, K is a non-increasing function of divergence. That is, K(Y0; X0, t0)  K(Y;
X, t) and therefore l  0.
(ii) The larger the divergence, the larger the decline of K, such that under typical conditions we have
K(Ydþ1; X, t) ¼ K(Yd; X, t)A
2l
¼ K(Y; X, t)A2l(dþ1) for distances in the explanandum, and
similarly for distances in the explanans.
We will review each argument separately.
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D.1. Statement (i)
From equation (D 1), if ld  0, and regardless of the base A chosen for the logarithm, we have
log
H(Y0)þH(X0) log p(t0)
H(Y)þH(X) log p(t)  log
H(Y0)H(Y0jX0, t0)
H(Y)H(YjX, t) ; log
I(Y0; X0, t0)
I(Y; X, t)
(D 2)
in which I(Y; X ) ¼ H(Y ) 2 H(YjX ) is the mutual information function.
Claiming that the explanandum Yd is at a divergence d from Y implies that not all information
about Yd may be contained in Y. This condition is typically described mathematically as a Markov
chain (MC). An MC is said to be formed by random variables (RVs) X, Y, Z in that order, and is
indicated as X! Y! Z, when the distribution of Z is conditionally independent of X. In other
words, the best predictor of Z is Y, and if Y is known, X adds nothing. In entropy terms, this entails
that H(ZjY, X ) ¼ H(ZjY ), and it formalizes our intuition that information transmitted along a noisy
channel tends to be lost.
Markov chains are used to model a variety of systems in the physical, biological and social sciences.
An isolated physical system, for example, would be represented as an MC, in which the transition
probabilities from one state of the system to the next are determined by the laws of physics. In the K
formalism, the laws of physics would be encoded in a t, whereas a Markov chain may consist in
the input X and subsequent states of Y, i.e. X! Y! Yd! Ydþ1 . . . . Other representations are
possible. For example, if no input is present, then the MC would consist in Y! Yd! Ydþ1 . . . or, if
the state of both input and explanandum is allowed to change, then the MC is (X, Y )! (Xd, Yd)!
(Xdþ1, Ydþ1) . . . .
Regardless of how it is formalized in K, a system describable by an MC is subject to a central result of
information theory, the data processing inequality (DPI), which states that the mutual information
between explanandum and explanans will be non-increasing. We will repeat here the proof of the
DPI assuming a constant t and a Markov chain X! Y! Yd. We consider the mutual information
between input and two states of the explanandum, and note that it can be expressed in two different
ways:
I(Y, Yd; X) ¼ I(Y; X)þ I(Yd; XjY) ¼ I(Yd; X)þ I(Y; XjYd) (D 3)
since by Markovity, I(Yd; XjY ) ¼ 0, and remembering that the mutual information is always non-negative
we re-arrange and conclude that
I(Yd; X) ¼ I(Y; X) I(Y; XjYd)  I(Y; X), (D 4)
which proves the DPI. Applying this result to inequality (D 2), we obtain
log
H(Yd)þH(X) log p(t)
H(Y)þH(X) log p(t)  log
I(Yd; X, t)
I(Y; X, t)
 0: (D 5)
Therefore, inequality (D 2) is always satisfied when H(Yd)  H(Y ) (which makes the left-hand side of
the inequality larger or equal to 0). In other words, K will always be non-increasing, as long as the
entropy in the explanandum is stable or increasing. A stable or increasing entropy is the most
probable condition of physical phenomena.
Although a less likely occurrence, it may be the case that the entropy of the explanandum actually
declines with divergence, in which case inequality (D 1) may or may not be satisfied. To examine this
case, let H(Yd) , H(Y ) ¼ H(Yd) þ dY, with dY . 0 quantifying the divergence. And, similarly, let
H(YjX, t) ¼ H(YdjX, t) þ dYjX. Then inequality (D 1) can be arranged as
H(Yd)þ dY þH(X) log p(t)
H(Yd)þH(X) log p(t) 
H(Yd)þ dY H(YdjX, t) dYjX
H(Yd)H(YdjX, t) , (D 6)
which with a few re-arrangements leads to the condition
K(Yd; X, t) 
dY  dYjX
dY
, (D 7)
which is not guaranteed to be true, but can in principle always be met. This follows because by definition
either dYjX. 0 and dY  dYjX (otherwise we would have I(Yd; X, t) . I(Y; X, t), contradicting the DPI), or
dYjX, 0, and again dY  dYjX, because dY  0. Therefore, the right-hand side is always non-negative, so it
could in principle be larger than the K value on the left-hand side. However, if dY ¼ dYjX, then the
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inequality is certainly false because in that case K(Yd; X, t) . 0. Therefore, we conclude that K may
increase with divergence, when the information in (the uncertainty, complexity of) the explanandum
decreases, which, however, is a less likely occurrence.
For the case of a theory/methodology t0 ¼ td at a divergence d from another t, the argument is only
slightly different. Crucial, in this case, is the assumption that the divergence d represents a random
deviation from t, i.e. one that is independent of t itself and is not determined by the value of K(Y;
X, td). This assumption is equivalent to that of made for a Markov chain, in which the t is subjected
to a level of noise proportional to d. However, the effects on K require a different analysis.
Firstly, note that the two components may have the same description length, log p(td) ¼ log p(t), or
not. In the former case, t and t0 differ solely in some of the symbols that compose them—in other words,
they encode the same number and types of choices, but differ in some of the specific choices made. In the
latter case, the distance d quantifies the information that is missing—in other words, the choices encoded
in t that are not specified in td—and logp(t) ¼ logp(td) þ d.
Starting with the case that td is not shorter than t, the consequences of a divergence d can be
understood by defining a set T d : {t1, t2 . . . td} of all possible (components of) theories of description
length 2logp(t), that are at an information distance d from the ‘original’ theory/methodology t. To
avoid confusion, we will henceforth indicate the latter with t*. Now, let Td be the uniform RV
corresponding to this set, and let Kd : {K(Y; X, ti) : ti [ T d} be the set of K values corresponding to
each instantiation of Td. Clearly, Kd has one maximum, except for the special case in which
K(Y; X, ti) ¼ K(Y; X, t j) 8ti, t j [ T d, and all K have exactly the same value irrespective of the
theory. If the latter were the case, then ti would be a redundant element of the theory/methodology,
in other words an unnecessary specification. However, such redundancies should not be a common
occurrence, if t is fixed to maximize K.
Therefore, excluding the improbable case in which ti is redundant, then Kd has a maximum. If t* is
the theory corresponding to the maximum value K(Y; X, t*) in Kd, then for all the remaining ti= t*, 0 
K(Y; X, ti) , K(Y; X, t*) and therefore K(Y; X, td) , K(Y; X, t*) or equivalently H(Y ) 2 H(YjX, td) ,
H(Y ) 2 H(YjX, t*), which satisfies inequality (D 1).
Lastly, if t* and td are both elements drawn at random from T d (in other words, neither was fixed
because of its resulting value of K), then their respective effects will both correspond, on the average,
to the expected value of the set:
H(Y)H(YjX, td) ¼ H(Y)H(YjX, t) ¼ H(Y)
X
ti[T d
Pr{Td ¼ ti}H(YjX, Td ¼ ti), (D 8)
which, on the average, would meet condition (D 1) as it entails equality (no decline in K). In practice, the
difference in K between two randomly chosen t* and td would be randomly distributed around the value
of zero.
The case of t* and td being random elements, however, is again generally implausible and unrealistic.
In the most probable scenario, a t was selected because it optimized the value of K in specific conditions.
If those conditions remain and the t is altered, then the default assumption must be that the
corresponding K will be lower.
This assumption of random differences is a rarely questioned standard in statistical modelling. In
meta-analysis, for example, between-study heterogeneity is assumed to be random and normally
distributed, which translates into assuming that the variance of effects produced by methodologically
heterogeneous studies is symmetrically distributed around a true underlying effect [79]. However,
examined from the perspective of how methods are developed to produce knowledge, a random
distribution of between-study differences does not appear to be the most likely, indeed the most
realistic, assumption.
The logic above can be extended to the case in which the two t components do not have the
same description length. In particular, let td represent a theory/methodology of shorter description
length, 2logp(t*) ¼ 2logp(td) þ d, and let Td be an RV with alphabet T d : {t1, t2 . . . td} representing
the set of all possible theories that have distance d from t*. Then inequality (D 1) can be re-arranged as
H(Y)þH(X) log p(td)þ d
H(Y)þH(X) log p(td) 
H(Y)H(YjX, Td ¼ t)
H(Y)Pti[T d Pr{Td ¼ ti}H(YjX, Td ¼ ti) , (D 9)
which leads to the condition
d  E[H(YjX, Td)]H(YjX, Td ¼ t
)
K(Y; X, Td)
(D 10)
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in which E[H(YjX, Td)] ¼
P
ti[T d
Pr{Td ¼ ti}H(YjX, Td ¼ ti) is the expected value of the residual entropy
across every possible specification of the t. Since d. 0, the inequality will not be satisfied if E[H(YjX,
Td)]  H(YjX, Td ¼ t*), i.e. t* yields a larger residual entropy than the average element in T d.
However, as argued above, this is the least likely scenario, as it would presuppose that the original
and longer theory/methodology t* had not been selected because it generated a relatively large K value.
D.2. Statement (ii)
With regard to divergences in the explanandum, the statement follows from the recursive validity of the
DPI. The statement entails that
l ¼ logH(Ydþ1)þH(X) log p(t)
H(Yd þH(X) log p(t)  log
H(Ydþ1)H(Ydþ1jX, t)
H(Yd)H(YdjX, t)
¼ logH(Ydþ1)þH(X) log p(t)
H(Yd þH(X) log p(t)  log
H(Yd)H(YdjX, t) (H(YdjYdþ1)H(YdjYdþ1, X, t))
H(Yd)H(YdjX, t)
¼ logH(Ydþ1)þH(X) log p(t)
H(Yd þH(X) log p(t)  log 1
I(Yd; X, tjYdþ1)
I(Yd; X, t)
 
: (D 11)
Therefore, l is a constant as long as the proportional loss of mutual information and/or the increase
in entropy of Y is constant. As before, whereas there may be peculiar circumstances in which this is not
the case, in general a proportional change follows from assuming that the loss is due to genuine noise.
Indeed, exponential curves describe how a Markov chain reaches a steady state [113]. Exponential
curves are also used to model the evolution of chaotic systems. A system is said to be chaotic when it
is highly sensitive to initial conditions. Since accuracy of measurement of initial states is limited,
future states of the system become rapidly unpredictable even when the system is seemingly simple
and deterministic. Paradigmatic chaotic systems, such as the three-body problem or the Lorenz
weather equations, share the characteristics of being strikingly simple and yet are extremely sensitive
to initial conditions, which make their instability particularly notable [114,115].
In standard chaos theory, the rapidity with which a system diverges from the predicted trajectory is
measured by an exponential function in the form:
dN
d0
 elN , (D 12)
in which dN/d0 is the relative offset after N steps (i.e. recalculations of the state of the system), and l is
known as Liapunov exponent, a parameter that quantifies sensitivity of the system to initial conditions.
Positive Liapunov exponents correspond to a chaotic system, and negative values correspond to stable
systems, i.e. systems that are resilient to perturbation. There is a clear analogy between Liapunov
exponents and l in equation (2.29), but the two are not equivalent, and the relationship between
chaos theory and K theory remains to be explored in future research.
The argument for a proportionality between the divergence d in t and the corresponding decline of
K is weaker, although rather intuitive. As already argued when formulating the theoretical argument
for K, the larger the set T b of possible theories, the lower the expected value of K in the set, K(Y,
X, Tb), because most of the theories/methodologies in the set are likely to be nonsensical and yield
K  0. Therefore, at least in very general terms, the relation of equation (2.29) holds for
divergences in t as well.
The argument in this case is weaker because the relation between the divergence of t, dt and K(Y; X,
td) is likely to be complex and idiosyncratic. For any given d, multiple different td are possible. For
example, if one binary choice in t is missing from td, then d ¼ 1 but the values of K(Y; X, td) can vary
greatly, from being approximately identical to K to being approximately zero, depending on what
element of the methodology is missing. Mathematically, this fact can be expressed by allowing
different values of l for any given distance. These values may be specific to a system and may need
to be estimated on a case-by-case basis.
Therefore, to allow practical applications, the relationship between K and dt is best modelled as the inner
product of two vectors, e.g. l  d ¼ dYlY þ dt1lt1 þ dt2lt2 þ    þ dtllt1, in which l ¼ lt1 þ lt2 þ    þ lt1
contains empirically derived estimates of the impact that distances of specific elements of the theory/
methodology have on K. Extending this model to divergences in explanandum and input leads to the
general formulation of equation (2.29).
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Appendix E
Let Xa be an RV quantized to resolution (i.e. bin size, or accuracy) a, and let a [ N be the size of the
alphabet of X, such that a ¼ 1/a. At no cost to generality, let an increase of resolution consist in the
progressive sub-partitioning of a, such that a0 ¼ a/q with q [ N, q  2. Then
0 , H(Xa
0
)H(Xa)  log (q): (E 1)
Proof. If H(Xa) ¼ Pa1 p(x) log p(x), with x representing any one of the a partitions, then
H(Xa
0
) ¼ Paq1 p(x0) log p(x0) ¼ Pa1Pq1 p(a)p(qja) log [p(a)p(qja)] ; H(A)þH(QjA), where Q and A
are the random variables resulting from the partitions. Known properties of entropy tell us that the
entropy produced by the q-partition of a is smaller or equal to the logarithm of the number q of partitions
with equality if and only if the q-partitions of a have all the same probability, i.e. H(QjA)  logq. A
E.1. Definition: maximal resolution
Let Xa be a generic quantized random variable with resolution a, and let a0 ¼ a/q represent a higher
resolution. The measurement error of Xa is a quantity e . 0, e [ Q such that:
H(Xa
0
)H(Xa) ¼ log (q), 8a  e (E 2)
E.2. Definition: empirical system
A system is said to be empirical if the quantization of explanandum and input has a maximal resolution.
Equivalently, a non-empirical, (i.e. logico-deductive) system is a system for which e ¼ 0.
The effect that a change in resolution has on K depends on the characteristic of the system, and in
particular on the speed with which the entropy of the explanandum and/or explanans increase
relative to their joint distribution.
For every empirical system for which there is a t= ; such that K(Y; X, t) . 0, the system’s
quantization YaY , XaX has optimal values of resolution ay and a

x such that:
K(Ya

Y ; Xa

X , t) . K(YaY ; XaX , t), 8aY = aY, aX = aX (E 3)
Proof. If a is the resolution of Y and a0 ¼ a/q is a higher resolution then, assuming for simplicity that
t is constant:
K(Ya
0
; X, t) . K(Ya; X, t),
H(Ya
0
)H(Ya0 jX, t)
H(Ya)H(YajX, t) .
H(Ya
0
)þH(X)þ t
H(Ya)þH(X)þ t : (E 4)
From equation (E 1), we know that H(Ya
0
)  H(Ya) þ log (q), assuming equality and re-arranging
equation (E 4) we get the condition:
H(Ya
0 jX, t)H(YajXt) , (1 K(Ya; X, t)) log (q), (E 5)
which is only satisfied when K(Ya; X, t) is small and H(Ya
0jX, t) 2 H(YajX, t)
 log (q).
The corresponding condition for X is
H(YjXa0 , t)H(YjXa, t) ,  log (q)K(Y; Xa, t), (E 6)
where the left-hand side has a lower bound in 2H(YjXa, t), whereas the right-hand side can be
arbitrarily negative.
Combining equations (E 4) and (E 6) yields the general condition:
K(YaY=qY ; XaX=qX , t) . K(YaY ; XaX , t)
, H(YaY=qY jXaX=qX , t)H(YaY jXaX , t) , (1 K) log qY  K log qX, (E 7)
in which K ; K(YaY ; XaX , t). The left-hand side of equation (E 7) is bounded between H(YaY ) and
H(YaY jXaX , t), whereas the right-hand side is bounded between log qYwhenK¼ 0 and2log qXwhenK¼ 1.
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The only scenario in which K never ceases to grow with increasing resolution entails e¼ 0 and thus a non-
empirical system (definition (E 2)). A
Appendix F
Proof. To simplify the notation, we will posit that the explanans is expanded by two positive elements
H(X0) and 2log p(t0).
K(YnY ; XnX , X0nX , t, t0) . K(YnY ; XnX , t)
! nYH(Y) nYH(YjX, X
0, t, t0)
nYH(Y)þ nXH(X)þ nXH(X0) log p(t) log p(t0)
.
nYH(Y) nYH(YjX, t)
nYH(Y)þ nXH(X) log p(t)
! (nYH(Y)þ nXH(X) log p(t))(nYH(Y) nYH(YjX, X0, t, t0))
 (nYH(Y)þ nXH(X)þ nXH(X0) log p(t) log p(t0))
 (nYH(Y) nYH(YjX, t)) . 0
! (nYH(Y)þ nXH(X) log p(t))(nYH(YjX, t) nYH(YjX, X0, t, t0))
. (nXH(X
0) log p(t0))(nYH(Y) nYH(YjX, t))
! nYH(YjX, t) nYH(YjX, X0, t, t0) . (nXH(X0) log p(t0))K(Y; X, t)
! (nYH(Y) nYH(YjX, X0, t, t0)) (nYH(Y) nYH(YjX, t))
. (nXH(X
0) log p(t0))K(Y; X, t)
! k0  k . nXH(X
0) log p(t0)
nYH(Y)
kh: (F 1)
A
The same result would be derived if H(X0) ; DH(X ) and 2log p(t0) ; 2Dlog p(t) represented any
difference in size, positive or negative, between two explanantia.
Appendix G
Proof.
K(Y; X,T) ¼ h
H(Y)
(H(Y)H(YjX,T)) ¼ h
H(Y)
(H(Y)H(Y,X,T)þH(X,T))
¼ h
H(Y)
(H(Y)H(Y,X,T)þH(X)þH(T)) ¼ h
H(Y)
(H(T) (H(Y,X,T)H(Y)H(X))
¼ h
H(Y)
(H(T)H(TjY,X)) ¼ K(T; Y, X): (G 1)
A
Appendix H
Proof. Let T be a random variable (RV) of alphabet T ¼ {t1, t2 . . . tz}, probability distribution p(t) and
entropy H(T) ¼ Pi p(ti) log p(ti). Let T0 be an RV derived from T by removing from its alphabet the
element t j [ T of probability p(tj). Then
H(T0) ¼ 1
1 p(t j)
X
i=j
p(ti) log
1
p(ti)
 log 1
1 p(t j) : (H 1)
When jT j ¼ 2, H(T0) ¼ 0 regardless of the probability distribution of T. Otherwise, the value rapidly
approaches H(T ) as p(tj) decreases (e.g. as the alphabet of T increases in size). Note that under
specific conditions H(T0) . H(T )—for example, if T equals p(tj) ¼ 0.9, p(tk) ¼ 0.05, P(tk) ¼ 0.05. This
entails that the uncertainty about a condition might momentarily increase if the most probable case is
excluded. However, the effect is circumscribed since, as more elements are removed from the
alphabet, H(T0) tends to 0. A
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